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Technical and Legal Approaches to
Unsolicited Electronic Mailt
By DAVID E. SORKIN*
"Spamming" is truly the scourge of the Information Age. This
problem has become so widespread that it has begun to burden
our information infrastructure. Entire new networks have had to
be constructed to deal with it, when resources would be far better
spent on educational or commercial needs.
United States Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT)1
UNSOLICITED ELECTRONIC MAIL, also called "spain," 2 causes or
contributes to a wide variety of problems for network administrators,
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1. Spamming: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (prepared statement of Sen. Burns), availa-
ble at 1998 WL 12761267 [hereinafter 1998 Senate Hearing].
2. The term "spain" reportedly came to be used in connection with online activities
following a mid-1980s episode in which a participant in a MUSH created and used a macro
that repeatedly typed the word "SPAM," interfering with others' ability to participate. See
J.D. Falk, The Net Abuse FAQ Revision 3.2, § 2.4, at http://www.cybernothing.org/faqs/net-
abuse-faq.html#2.4 (Dec. 23, 1998). A MUSH, or multi-user shared hallucination, is a type
of MUD-a multi-user dimension or dungeon. See Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of
Computing, at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?Multi-User+Shared+Hallucina-
tion (last visited Nov. 16, 2000) (defining "MUSH") & at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/
foldoc/foldoc.cgi?MUD (last modified Apr. 16, 1995) (defining "MUD"). The perpetrator
presumably chose the word "spain" as an allusion to a Monty Python skit that depicted a
restaurant in which every meal contained Spam, a meat product that many people appar-
ently consider unpalatable. See Falk, supra. Other reports omit the MUSH episode entirely,
linking current usage of the word "spam" directly to the Monty Python routine or even to
the meat product itself. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1018 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1997); David T. Bartels, Note, Canning Spain: California Bans
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 420, 420 n.1 (1999); Steven E. Bennett,
Note, Canning Spam: CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 32 U. RicH. L. REv. 545,
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businesses and other organizations, and individual users of the In-
ternet.3 Spam has traditionally been viewed mainly as a nuisance, but
it also constitutes a security threat.4
Three general categories of approaches have been used to ad-
dress the spam problem: informal measures, such as social norms and
self-regulatory efforts; 5 technical measures undertaken by individuals
and organizations; 6 and legal responses, 7 including both litigation
under existing statutes and traditional common-law theories and new
549 n.30 (1998); Anne E. Hawley, Comment, Taking Spam Out of Your Cyberspace Diet: Com-
mon Law Applied to Bulk Unsolicited Advertising via Electronic Mail 66 UMKC L. REv. 381, 381
n.3 (1997); Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First
Amendment, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 247 n.14 (1998); Gary S. Moorefield, Note,
SPAM-It's Not Just for Breakfast Anymore: Federal Legislation and the Fight to Free the Internet
From Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 5 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 10, 1 n.1 (1999), at http://
www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume5/5bujstilO.pdf; Hormel Foods Corp., SPAM and the In-
ternet, at http://www.spam.com/ci/ciin.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
At first, the term "spam" was used to refer to articles posted to Usenet newsgroups or
other discussion forums in violation of certain forum policies or other rules or customs. See
Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?query=spam (last modified Apr. 8, 1997) (defining "spam"). Later, the term
came to be used for various types of unwanted e-mail messages, usually advertisements sent
out in large quantifies. See id.; see also generally ALAN SCHWARTZ & SIMSON GARFINKEL, STOP-
PING SPAM 17-35 (1998) (telling the history of spam). The latter sense-more precisely, "e-
mail spam"-has eclipsed the former, and is the sense in which the term is used in this
Article.
"Spam" has also been used to describe other online phenomena, such as the gratui-
tous repetition of words in a web page and similar activities designed to increase the likeli-
hood that the page will be retrieved by search engines. See, e.g., David J. Loundy, E-LAW 4:
Computer Information Systems Law and System Operator Liability, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1075,
1183 n.702 (1998); Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search
Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 45-46 (1998); Steve Silberman, Net Mom
Battles "Spamdexing" by Sex Site, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 11, 1997, at http://www.wired.com/news/
culture/0,1 284,1978,00.html.
The term "spam" has become so well-known that it is now being used to describe
unwanted telephone calls and faxes. See, e.g., Bradley Foss, "Blasts"Filling Voice Mail: A Nui-
sance, or an Efficient Way to Communicate?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1999, 1999 WL 2920496
(describing automated voicemail blasts as "phone spam"); Drew Cullen, LA Citizens Tackle
NFL in Mass Fax Spam, REG. (London), Aug. 25, 1999, http://www.theregister.co.uk/con-
tent/archive/6369.html.
3. See discussion infta Part I.B.
4. See CERT Coordination Ctr., Email Bombing and Spamming, at http://
www.cert.org/techtips/emailbombing-spamming.html (last modified Apr. 26, 1999)
(discussing ways to react and respond to spam); Computer Incident Advisory Capability,
U.S. Dep't of Energy, E-Mail Spamming Countermeasures, at http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/bulle-
tins/i-005c.html (Nov. 25, 1997) (same); see also discussion infra Part I.B.3 (discussing
spam's threat to security).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
[Vol. 35
legislation that specifically targets spam. s The current trend appears
to involve a diminished reliance on self-regulation and other informal
measures in favor of increased emphasis on more formal responses,
both technical and legal. This Article discusses the variety of mecha-
nisms that have been used in the war on spam.
I. Background
To many people, spam means little more than "unwanted e-mail,"
it is perhaps tautological to say that nearly everyone agrees that spam
is undesirable. The controversies surrounding spam, therefore, tend
to relate less to its legitimacy than to how it should be defined, how
important a problem it is, and what, if anything, ought to be done
about it.9
A. Defining Spam
The difficulties in addressing the problem of spam begin at the
definitional stage: Internet users and providers differ widely in how
they define spam and other forms of objectionable e-mail. Some peo-
ple consider all advertisements or even all unwanted messages to be
spam,' 0 while others try to define it in terms of existing acceptable use
8. These categories can be loosely compared to the four types of constraints on be-
havior outlined by Lawrence Lessig: law, norms, markets, and architecture (or "code"). See
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAws OF CYBERSPACE 89 (1999); Lawrence Lessig,
Comment, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REv. 501,508-09
(1999) [hereinafter Lessig, Law of the Horse].
9. Though it may seem unnecessarily loaded, the term "legitimate" is commonly
used to describe e-mail that is not spam. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc.,
No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226, at *13 n.13 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998) (noting
that "there is no legitimate market for unsolicited bulk e-mail"); Lorrie Faith Cranor &
Brian A. LaMacchia, Spam., COMM. ACM, Aug. 1998, at 74, 78 (distinguishing spain from
"legitimate messages"), available at http://www.research.att.com/-lorrie/pubs/spam/
spam.html.
10. For example, in March 2000, the mayor of Denver and other government officials
received thousands of e-mail messages alleging racial bias in criminal charges that had
been filed against a Kuwaiti man, after the man's relatives posted a web site encouraging
people to send such messages. See Kevin Flynn, Defendant's Family Urges Spam E-mail Officials
See Blizzard of Messages Regarding Kuwaiti Facing Charges of Attempted Murder, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS (Denver), Mar. 25, 2000, 2000 WL 6591185. Both the mayor's spokesperson and
a newspaper article describing the incident referred to the messages as "spam." See id. The
term "spam" has also been used to describe virus warnings, urban legends, jokes, chain
letters, and similar messages forwarded by relatives and other acquaintances. See, e.g., Phae-
dra Hise, Mom Spam: The Cyber-Scourge of Families Everywhere, SALON, Dec. 20, 1999, at http://
www.salon.com/mwt/feature/1999 /12/20/spam/.
Perhaps more akin to the type of spam discussed in this Article is the use of "viral"
marketing techniques in which merchants recruit individuals to forward solicitations to
their acquaintances on the merchant's behalf. See Ed Foster, Viral Marketing Goes One Step
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policies or network etiquette (or "netiquette") rules. The two most
common definitions of spam are unsolicited commercial e-mail
("UCE") and unsolicited bulk e-mail ("UBE").w
1. Unsolicited
The key aspect of nearly all definitions of spam is that the e-mail
messages must be "unsolicited." In general, a communication is con-
sidered to be unsolicited if there is no prior relationship between the
parties, and the recipient has not explicitly consented to receive the
communication. 12 It can also mean that the recipient has previously
Too Far-to a Place Where Friends Spain Friends, INFOWORLD, Feb. 7, 2000, http://
www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/00/02/07/OOO207opfoster.xml.
11. In a 1999 survey of over 13,000 Internet users, the majority of respondents consid-
ered both UCE and UBE to be spare. See Gartner Group, ISPs and Span: The Impact of Span
on Customer Retention and Acquisition, at 6, at http://www.brightmail.com/global/pdf/gart-
ner.pdf (June 14, 1999). A smaller number of respondents also said they viewed chain
letters, duplicate postings, and pop-up ads as spain. See id.
UCE and UBE are not mutually exclusive, of course, and a third alternative is to de-
fine spam as unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail ("UBCE"), although this may be function-
ally equivalent to UCE. See discussion infra Part I.A.4. Delaware's statute-probably the
most restrictive anti-spain statute enacted to date-prohibits UBCE outright, but includes
an exception for messages that are "sent between human beings," whatever that means. See
Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 7 (1999) (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit.
11, § 937(a)).
12. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4(e), 17538.45(a)(2) (Deering Supp.
2000); Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/5 (West Supp. 2000);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.730(1) (Michie Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STA-r. § 14-453(10)
(1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(e) (Supp. 1999); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1,
2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2032 (to be codified at CoLo. REV. SrAT. § 6-2.5-102(5)). A bill
introduced in the House of Representatives last year would have limited the "pre-existing
business relationship" to the preceding five-year period for purposes of determining
whether a message is unsolicited. See Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000,
H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 3(10) (A) (i). This bill has been reintroduced in the 107th Con-
gress. See Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 2001, H.R. 95, 107th Cong.
Some jurisdictions omit "unsolicited" altogether. Washington and Oklahoma's restric-
tions on falsified routing information apply to solicited as well as unsolicited e-mail
messages. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.190.010(2) (West Supp. 2001); Act of June 8,
1999, ch. 337, § 1, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515, 1515 (to be codified at OKLA. STAr. tit. 15,
§ 776.1 (A)).
Interestingly, none of the definitions of "unsolicited" even consider whether or how
narrowly the message is targeted. Thus, for example, a publisher's message promoting a
new textbook qualifies as unsolicited whether it is sent to ten million random e-mail ad-
dresses, to 100,000 people whose addresses include ".edu," or to 100 professors who teach
courses in the field covered by the book, absent a prior relationship between the publisher
and the recipients of the message. "Opt-in" e-mail marketing firms generally promise to
target solicitations in exchange for obtaining recipients' permission to send advertising
messages. See, e.g., ChooseYourMail, About Us, at http://www.chooseyourmail.com/
AboutUs.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); PostMasterDirect.com, Welcome to PostM as-
terDirect.com, the Leader in 100% Opt-In® Email Marketing!, at http://www.postmasterdirect.
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sought to terminate the relationship, usually by instructing the other
party not to send any more communications in the future. 13
From a legal perspective, the term "unsolicited" is nothing new; it
has the same meaning in the context of restrictions on telephone so-
licitations and other forms of direct marketing. 14 From a technical
perspective, however, it may be much more difficult to assess whether
an e-mail communication is unsolicited, particularly if the prior rela-
tionship is comprised of something other than a previous exchange of
e-mail messages.
2. Commercial
Some definitions of spam include only messages that are com-
mercial in nature. "Commercial" is generally defined in terms of mes-
sage content rather than the sender's actual or presumed motivation
for sending the message; a typical definition includes any message that
com (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); YesMail.com, The YesMail Network, at http://
www.yesmail.com//network.asp?sec=mkt (last visited Nov. 21, 2000). It is the permission,
not the targeting, that prevents such messages from being considered unsolicited.
13. Such a request is commonly referred to as an "opt-out" request. Communication
with a person who has previously opted out is frequently omitted from statutory definitions
of "unsolicited," but statutes that omit such communications from the definition typically
include a separate provision restricting post-opt-out communications. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17538.4(c) (Deering Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.1 (2) (e) (West
Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(c) (Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(c)
(Supp. 1999); ColoradoJunk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2033 (to
be codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 6-2.5-103(5)); Act ofJuly 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del.
Laws 7, 8 (1999) (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 938(a)); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch.
423, § 1, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1374 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-
603E(3) (d)).
A broad interpretation of "unsolicited" might include all contacts that are not part of
a current transaction. For example, suppose that a person purchases a bottle of aspirin at a
supermarket using a credit card, and the store somehow is able to obtain the person's e-
mail address. If the store subsequently sends the person an e-mail message advertising a
sale on acetaminophen, this communication could be considered unsolicited under such a
definition. Such a scenario is more likely to occur if the purchaser presents a membership
card for the store's discount or "loyalty" program during the transaction, enabling the
store to link the transaction to personal information about the purchaser already in its
files. However, in this modified version of the scenario, the purchaser may have previously
consented to receive subsequent unrelated communications from the store, so the commu-
nication probably would not be considered unsolicited.
14. See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 22 7 (a)(4)
(1994) (defining "unsolicited advertisement" as advertising material transmitted without
the recipient's prior express consent); id. § 227(a) (3) (B) (exempting calls made to per-
sons with whom the caller has an established business relationship); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(e) (2) (iii), (vi) (1999) (requiring telemarketers to record and honor "do-not-
call" requests).
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promotes the sale of goods or services. 15 Ideally, indirect as well as
direct commercial content ought to qualify-for example, an e-mail
message containing a review of a free web site that contains advertise-
ments should be considered commercial if it is sent on behalf of the
web site's operator. In any event, with an appropriate legal definition,
it will normally be relatively easy to determine whether a message is
commercial. In close cases, the question will be one of fact. 16 How-
ever, the content-sensitive nature of the distinction may make it much
more difficult to implement such a distinction using an automated
technical process.
3. Bulk
The real problem with spam lies in the volume of e-mail
messages, not their content. For that reason, spam is sometimes de-
fined as messages sent in large quantities-i.e., "bulk" e-mail.1 7 A sin-
gle message sent to a very large number of recipients clearly qualifies
as bulk.' 8 By the same token, separate but identical copies of a mes-
15. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 2000); Illinois
Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 511/5 (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 714E.1(1) (a) (West Supp. 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.1(13) (West Supp. 2000);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.710 (Michie Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-453(lb) (1999);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(e) (Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(a) (Supp. 1999);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.190.010(2) (West Supp. 2001); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch.
388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2032 (to be codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-
102(5)); Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 3, 72 Del. Laws 7, 9 (1999) (to be codified at DEL.
CODE tit. 11, § 931(17)); Act ofJune 27, 2000, ch. 763, § A, 2000 Mo. Laws 735, 747-48 (to
be codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.1300(2)); cf Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a) (4) (1994) (defining "unsolicited advertisement" in context of
solicitations by telephone and facsimile machine).
16. See, e.g., Lutz Appellate Servs. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that "help wanted" ads are not "advertisements" under the narrow definition in
Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
17. See infra note 23 (defining what constitutes "bulk").
18. A single message sent to a large number of recipients commonly is sent with the
recipients' addresses contained in one or more blind carbon copy ("BCC") header lines.
See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 53. The header of a standard e-mail message
includes several lines identifying the intended recipients of the message. See id. The "TO"
line identifies the primary addressee or addressees; the carbon copy line ("CC") designates
secondary addressees; and the BCC line is used to list recipients whose names and e-mail
addresses will not appear on the copies of the message delivered to the recipients. See id. at
49, 53; David H. Crocker, Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages (Request for
Comments No. 822), at 23, at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc822.txt (Aug. 13, 1982). Partic-
ularly when a message is being sent to a large number of people, the BCC field is useful
because it reduces the size of the message header-conserving bandwidth and improving
readability of the message-while protecting the privacy of recipients. SeeAvi Mesher, Third
Party Software Support, at http://www.palmtoppaper.com/ptphtml/51/51000020.htm (last
visited Dec. 22, 2000). Spammers often use the BCC field to conceal the fact that a message
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sage that are sent to a large number of recipients are also considered
to be sent in bulk. The only distinction between the two is the stage at
which the message is copied, or "exploded."'19
Substantially similar messages, as well as identical copies of a sin-
gle message, probably also qualify as "bulk" under this rule. For exam-
ple, a sender may make very minor changes to each copy of a
message-perhaps by personalizing it in a manner similar to the com-
puter-generated mailings that promote sweepstakes offers, 20 by plac-
ing a unique, and typically invalid, sender address on each copy, or by
spreading them out over hours or days rather than sending them all
simultaneously. Bulk messages that use one or more such variations
may be somewhat more difficult to detect from a technical perspec-
tive, but that problem is certainly easier than the subjective evaluation
of content required to distinguish between commercial and noncom-
mercial messages. 21
The main issue lies in how many copies of a message must be sent
and within what time period for them to qualify as a bulk transmis-
sion. There is no generally agreed upon threshold; indeed, there is
even some resistance in the anti-spain community to establishing or
is being sent to many people simultaneously, although the lack of a TO or CC header
containing the recipient's address can be used by filters to help determine whether an
inbound message should be classified as spam. See Jim Hu, Hotmail Adds Filters to Combat
Unsolicited Email, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 9, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/category/0-
1005-200-1568584.html.
Internet e-mail messages are transmitted using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
("SMTP"). See Jonathan B. Postel, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Request for Comments No.
821), at 1, at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc821.txt (Aug. 1982). The sender transmits the
message using an SMTP server-usually, one maintained by the sender's own Internet ser-
vice provider. See id. at 2. Unless the intended recipient is a local user of that server, the
message is then forwarded to another SMTP server, which accepts it for delivery to the
recipient. See id. at 3. When a message contains multiple addresses in the TO, CC, and BCC
fields, the SMTP server through which the message is sent contacts the servers that receive
messages on behalf of each of the addressees, and transmits one copy of the message to
each such server. See id.
19. A "mail exploder" is a server that takes an incoming message and forwards copies
of the message to multiple recipients. See Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of Comput-
ing, at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?mail:ploder (last visited Nov. 16,
2000) (defining "mail exploder"). One common application of mail exploders is the oper-
ation of Internet mailing lists. See id.
20. Sending separate copies of a message to many recipients, whether identical or
merely similar, may be more costly to the sender in terms of bandwidth and computing
resources than sending a single copy to multiple recipients. It may also be more difficult
for recipients and third parties to detect, but the end result is roughly the same.
21. Collaborative filtering techniques, for example, can be used to compare messages
sent to many different received in order to evaluate whether they should be classified as
spam. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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disclosing a precise threshold.22 An arbitrary number could certainly
be selected, such as ten or one thousand copies sent within one day or
one week.23 Alternatively, a specified number of independent reports
of a message sent to undisclosed recipients24 could give rise to a pre-
sumption that the message was sent in bulk.25
22. Among the arguments against a precise threshold are: while the damage caused
by spam is usually related to the number of copies of a message that are transmitted, the
relationship is not necessarily proportional, and a small-scale spam can cause as much dam-
age as a large-scale one; spammers would respond to a clearly disclosed threshold by adjust-
ing their message volume to accommodate it (for example, by sending one message fewer
than the threshold within the specified time period); the existence of a fixed threshold
would encourage spammers to find ways to circumvent it (for example, by sending spam
under different names, or by spreading their message traffic over a slightly longer time
period); and the certainty and approbation afforded by such a threshold would legitimize
the actions of existing spammers and encourage others to begin spamming.
In contrast, there are commonly applied formulae for determining whether messages
posted to Usenet newsgroups qualify as spam. The Breidbart Index is one example, which
uses a function of the number of separate copies of a message that are posted and the
number of newsgroups to which each copy is cross-posted. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL,
supra note 2, at 31. Various automated and manual services use the Breidbart Index to
decide whether to post "cancel" messages intended to halt propagation of the putative
sparn. See id,
23. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.1(13) (West Supp. 2000) (defining "unsolic-
ited bulk electronic mail" as an e-mail advertisement that is "sent in the same or substan-
tially similar form to more than one thousand recipients"); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423,
§ 1, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1373 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(1) (a))
(defining "bulk electronic mail advertisement" as "the same or similar advertisement...
contemporaneously transmitted to two (2) or more recipients"); Eriecoast, Eriecoast Service
Policy and Acceptable Practices, at http://www.eriecoast.com/AboutUs/PoliciesProce-
dures/policies-procedures.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (20 or more recipients);
Flashcom, Inc., Acceptable Use Policy, at http://www.flashcom.com/pdfs/acceptableuse.pdf
(Feb. 2000) (10 or more recipients); InterAccess Co., Acceptable Use Policy, at http://
www.interaccess.com/products/aup.shtml (last modified Aug. 19, 1999) (more than 10 re-
cipients) [hereinafter InterAccess, Acceptable Use Policy]; Juno Online Servs., Inc., Guidelines
for Acceptable Use, at http://account.juno.com/policies/guidelines.html (last visited Aug. 8,
2000) (more than 50 recipients) [hereinafter Juno, Guidelines].
24. See discussion supra note 18 (describing use of BCC header lines to conceal recipi-
ents of a bulk message).
25. The number of copies that ought to be required to trigger a presumption of bulk
mailing should be relatively low, since it is unlikely that most of the copies will be re-
ported-even if most of them are deliverable, and even if centralized spain collection ef-
forts such as the Spam Recycling Center are successful. See discussion of Spam Recycling
Center infra note 99. If the conclusion that a message constitutes spain is likely to result in
sanctions, then the severity of those sanctions also ought to be considered in determining
the number of copies that must be reported, since that number will have a substantial
effect on the rate of false positives.
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4. UBE Versus UCE
There are many varieties of noncommercial spam, including
charitable fundraising solicitations,26 opinion surveys,27 religious
messages, 28 political advertisements, 29 wartime propaganda,3 0 virus
hoaxes and other urban legends, 31 chain letters, 32 and hate e-mail. 33
Nonetheless, at present, most unsolicited bulk e-mail messages con-
tain commercial advertisements, and the vast majority of unsolicited
commercial e-mail messages are sent in bulk.34 The distinction be-
tween unsolicited commercial e-niail ("UCE") and unsolicited bulk e-
mail ("UBE"), therefore, may be somewhat academic, though it is the
subject of considerable controversy within the anti-spam community,
as well as among legislative bodies that have considered enacting re-
strictions on spam
26. See, e.g., Chris Partridge, Charities Learn to Love the Internet, TIMES (London), July
20, 1999, 1999 WL 8009970.
27. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 21-22; Jean Goodwin, Research or
Spam? A Case Study in University Network Use Policy, at http://pubweb.acns.nwu.edu/
-jgo259/resspam/front.html (1998).
28. See, e.g., Eric Blom, Online Evangelists Spread Word but the Message Is Not Always Wel-
come on the Internet, as Barrages of Hostile E-Mail Attest, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Feb. 16,
1997, 1997 WL 4117507; WitchVox, Community Thoughts Specifically on PAGAN Spam, at
http://www.witchvox.com/surveys/pagan-spamthoughts.html (Sept. 4, 1999).
29. See Deborah Scoblionkov, When Candidates Spam, SALON, Feb. 19, 1999, at http://
www.salon.com/21st/feature/1999/02/19feature.html.
30. See Editorial, Waging War by E-Mail, CHI. TPmB., Apr. 3, 1999, 1999 WL 2859907
(describing Serbian spam campaign ridiculing NATO attack).
31. See Computer Incident Advisory Capability, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Hoax Busters, at
http://hoaxbusters.ciac.org/ (last modified Jan. 17, 2001); Patrick Crispen, Map09: Spam-
ming and Urban Legends, at http://www.webreference.com/roadmap/map09.html (last
modified Sept. 30, 1996).
32. See Computer Incident Advisory Capability, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Hoax Busters, at
http://hoaxbusters.ciac.org/ (last modified Jan. 17, 2001); Ind. Univ. Knowledge Base,
What Is Electronic Chain Mail?, at http://kb.indiana.edu/data/aexs.htnl (last modified June
12, 1997).
33. See, e.g., David Rosenzweig, Man Charged in Sending Hate E-Mail to Latinos Across
U.S., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at BI; Eric Slater, Racist E-Mail at Iowa College Is Linked to
Black Student, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at A31.
34. See Brad Templeton, Top Ten Reasons Not to Regulate Non-Bulk E-mail, at http://
www.templetons.com/brad/spume/topl0.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2000).
35. The leading anti-spain advocacy group is the Coalition Against Unsolicited Com-
mercial Email (CAUCE); its international affiliates include CAUCE India, the European
Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (EuroCAUCE), and the Coalition Against
Unsolicited Bulk Email, Australia (CAUBE.AU). See CAUCE, at http://www.cauce.org (last
visited Aug. 8, 2000); CAUBE.AU, at http://www.caube.org.au (last visited Aug 8, 2000);
CAUCE India, at http://www.india.cauce.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); EuroCAUCE, at
http://www.euro.cauce.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). Among American states that have
enacted spam-related legislation, some have focused on UCE, others on UBE, and yet
others on UBCE. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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a. Arguments for Defining Spam as UCE
Several arguments support defining spam as UCE: (1) because
spam shifts costs from the sender to recipients, 36 its use for commer-
cial purposes is particularly objectionable; (2) defining spam as UCE
rather than UBE avoids the need to establish a specific threshold for
"bulk;" (3) noncommercial messages (especially political and religious
messages) may be protected speech, while commercial messages can
be regulated without running afoul of the First Amendment;3 7 (4) ex-
isting laws regulating commercial telephone and facsimile machine
solicitations38 could easily be extended to cover commercial solicita-
tions transmitted by e-mail; 39 and (5) regulation limited to commer-
cial messages stands a better chance of being adopted than does
regulation applicable to both commercial and noncommercial
messages.
36. See David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 1001, 1010 & nn.45-46 (1997) (describing cost-shifting
effects of spain), available at http://www.spamlaws.com/articles/buffalo.html.
37. Cf., e.g., Lutz Appellate Servs. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180, 182 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(dictum) (questioning whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit all unsolicited fax
transmissions, rather than only unsolicited advertisements). But cf. City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993) (holding that government cannot re-
strict only commercial speech without an adequate basis for distinguishing between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech). First Amendment concerns are largely beyond the
scope of this Article. For analyses of the First Amendment implications of legal restrictions
on spam, see Steven E. Bennett, Note, Canning Spam: CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promo-
tions, Inc., 32 U. RiCH. L. REv. 545 (1998); Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerging Media
and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, Il BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 233 (1996), avail-
able at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/11-2/carroll.html; Cathryn Le,
Note, How Have Internet Service Providers Beat Spammers?, 5 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (1998), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v5i2/le.html; Richard C. Lee, Note, Cyber Promotions,
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 417 (1998); Marcus, supra note 2.
Nearly all of the spain-related lawsuits to date have involved commercial messages. See
discussion infra Part [V.A. But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944,
at *1, *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) (enjoining defendant from sending bulk messages
protesting plaintiff's employment practices into plaintiffs e-mail system), appealfiled, No.
C033076 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000), http://www.intelhamidi.com/appealbrief.htm. Intel
Corp. is discussed at length in Susan M. Ballantine, Note, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving
New Problems with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209 (2000), and in Developments in
the Law-The Law of Cyberspace: The Long Arm of Cyber-reach, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1610,
1622-24, 1629-34 (1999) [hereinafter Developments].
38. See, eg, Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
39. This approach was taken in one of the first federal spam bills. See Netizens Protec-
tion Act of 1997, H.R. 1748, 105th Cong.
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b. Arguments for Defining Spare as UBE
The primary argument for defining spam as UBE is simply that
the commercial or noncommercial nature of an unsolicited message
has little or nothing to do with the damage that is inflicted. The prob-
lem is not exactly that costs are shifted from the sender to recipients,
but merely that recipients, and intermediate networks, sustain costs
involuntarily; the sender's motivation is largely irrelevant.40 Further-
more, a legal rule against all unsolicited bulk e-mail is arguably more
content-neutral than a rule that focuses on commercial messages. 41 A
rule focusing only on commercial messages might well open the flood-
gates to a massive increase in noncommercial spam.42 Since the prob-
lem with spam is volume, not content, the UBE approach seems to
make more sense.
Restricting all unsolicited e-mail, rather than merely UCE or
UBE, is probably not a realistic option. Individual, noncommercial,
unsolicited messages are far less objectionable than UCE or UBE, 43
and a much stronger case can be made for constitutional protection
of such messages than for either UCE or UBE.
A fourth alternative would be to limit the definition to messages
that are both commercial and sent in bulk, "UBCE" for short. Since
nearly allUCE is sent in bulk, this approach is roughly equivalent to
defining spam as UCE, though it would be accompanied by the same
evidentiary difficulties as the UBE definition.
Whichever definition of spam is used, there are likely to be signif-
icant problems in defining precisely what is meant by "commercial" or
40. It may make more sense to adjust the penalty according to the sender's motives or
the message content, just as one might penalize a thief more harshly than a vandal.
41. This is not to argue that a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
messages is legally indefensible-the Ninth Circuit deferred to Congress' findings when it
upheld the unsolicited fax law, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994), in Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC,
46 F.3d 54, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Similar legislative findings could likely support a ban on
UCE, as well as a ban on all UBE.
42. For example, one person could send messages espousing a particular view on a
political or social issue to millions of Internet users. If recipients appear to be hostile to
such messages, then the sender might send messages espousing the opposite view-and
conceivably, the sender's goal might be merely to draw attention to an issue. It is perhaps
surprising that anti-spain activists have not already begun using spam to promote their
views-certainly most people who found themselves receiving hundreds or thousands of
such 'junk" messages each day would want something to be done about it.
43. Examples of individual noncommercial unsolicited messages include a message of
introduction to a person whom the sender believes to be a relative or former classmate,
and a request for permission to quote another person in print, or to reprint an excerpt
from the person's writing, or to link to the person's web site. All of these are unsolicited
messages, but under ordinary circumstances few people would consider them to be spam.
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"bulk" e-mail, and these definitional problems may serve as a barrier
to effective responses to the spain problem.
B. The Spam Problem
1. Objectionable Content
Spam is problematic for a number of reasons. Many of the objec-
tions to spam relate to its content. For example, some object to receiv-
ing commercial messages, particularly those that promote
questionable ventures like pyramid schemes and multi-level marketing
scams.44 Others are offended by messages that contain or advertise
sexually explicit material. 45 Such messages are particularly troubling
when they are sent to minors; senders of unsolicited messages rarely
know the age of persons to whom the messages are sent.46 Spam with
hostile file attachments or embedded code can even pose a security
threat, as was the case with the Melissa virus spam.47 But spam is also
problematic for reasons unrelated to its content.
2. Consumption of Internet Resources
Spam represents a significant proportion of all e-mail traffic, con-
suming massive amounts of network bandwidth, memory, storage
space, and other resources. 48 Internet users and system administrators
44. The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in particular has focused on spam that
promotes fraudulent activities. See, e.g., Spamming: The E-Mail You Want to Can: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, & Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Com-
merce, 106th Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of Eileen Harrington, FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection), 1999 WL 27596532 [hereinafter 1999 House Hearing]; Federal Trade Comm'n,
FTC Consumer Alert!: FTC Names Its Dirty Dozen: 12 Scams Most Likely to Arrive Via Bulk Email,
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/doznalrt.htm (July 1998); Federal Trade
Comm'n, FTC Sues Spammer: Alleges Business Opportunity Falsely Promoted in Unsolicited Com-
mercial E-Mail, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9803/ibb.htm (Mar. 4, 1998). See generally
Jennifer M. Kappel, Comment, Government Intervention on the Internet: Should the Federal Trade
Commission Regulate Unsolicited E-Mail Advertising?, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011 (1999).
45. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-2(4) (Michie 1999); Jo Vandermause, Com-
ment, You've Got Indecent E-Mail!, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1259.
46. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855-56 & n.20 (1997).
47. SeeAndrew Brown, Micro Organism (Spamming), NEW STATESMAN, Apr. 9, 1999, 1999
WL 13029502; Mitch Wagner, Melissa Puts IT Readiness to Test, INTERNET WK., Apr. 5, 1999,
http://www.internetwk.com/story/INW19990402S003 (discussing how the Melissa virus
infected computers use "of Microsoft Office macros and the Microsoft Outlook e-mail cli-
ent to broadcast itself over the Internet, tying up network traffic and infecting computers
with code that could rebroadcast any document created with Microsoft Word").
48. See 1999 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 41 (statement of Michael Russina, SBC
Internet Services) (citing spain rate of 35%, and describing spain-related costs incurred by
SBC); 1998 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 27-28 (statement of Ray Everett-Church, Coali-
tion Against Unsolicited Commercial Email) (discussing costs imposed by spam); Cranor &
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spend a great deal of time reading, deleting, filtering, and blocking
spam, so Internet users pay more for Internet access as a result of
spam. 49 Spam and anti-spam measures frequently interfere with other
e-mail traffic and other legitimate Internet uses. 50
Spam has few redeeming features to balance these substantial
costs. It is a singularly ineffective method of direct marketing,51 but
LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 75, 78 (reporting spam rates of 2% for a large ISP and 10% for
a corporate network, and citing other estimates of 30% to 50% for AOL and 15% for
another ISP); Daniel P. Dern, Postage Due on Junk E-Mail-Spam Costs Internet Millions Every
Month, INTERNET WK., May 4, 1998, at TI (citing spam rates ranging from 3% to 30% at
various ISPs, and discussing costs imposed by spam), http://www.techweb.com/se/
directlink.cgi?INW19980504S0003; Jim Hu, Yahoo Adds Spam Filter to Email, But Will It
Work, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 1, 1999 (citing estimate that spam represents 10% of all e-
mail traffic), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1476013.html.
49. See, e.g., Dern, supra note 48 (claiming that individual customers of ISPs pay nearly
$2 extra per month because of e-mail and Usenet span); see also authorities cited supra
note 48.
50. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc., No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20226, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998) (describing outages caused by inbound
spain); 1998 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 27 (statement of Ray Everett-Church, Coalition
Against Unsolicited Commercial Email) (same); Alan Boyle, Spam Hits the House of Repre-
sentatives, ZDNET, Oct. 5, 1999 (same), at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/
0,4586,2347919,00.html;Jeremy Crandell, The Cost of Span, at http://www.brightmail.com/
spam/cost/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (same); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Info.
Servs., Inc., No. 97-5931, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15344, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997)
(describing denial-of-service attacks on spammer's ISP); Carol Neshevich, ISP Burned by
Spammer, NETWORK WORLD CAN., Apr. 24, 1998, LEXIS, All News Group File (describing
denial-of-service attacks targeting company whose name appeared in spam); Plaintiffs
Complaint, Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1998) (No. 98-CIV-5489)
(describing ISP's cancellation of subscriber's account based upon erroneous spamming
accusation), http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/hall-complaint-798.html [hereinafter
Hall Complaint]; Chris Oakes, The Case of the Mistaken Spammer, WIRED NEWS, May 4, 1998
(same), at http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/12065.html; Ed Foster,
Spaminmers Get Aggressive: Readers Report Threats and E-Mail Bomb Attacks, INFOWORLD, Apr. 10,
2000, at 114 (describing mailbombing attacks by spammers against anti-spam activists),
http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/00/0 4 /10/OOO41Oopfoster.xml; Todd Wal-
lack, AOL Blocking Pac Bell E-Mail in Effort to Thwart Spammers, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2000, at
Bi (describing how spain-blocking measures also block legitimate e-mail);Jon Swartz, Anti-
Spam Service orMcCarthyism?, S.F. CHRON., May 10, 1999, at BI (same); Andrew Backover, E-
mail "Spat" Being Settled at E-snail's Pace, DENVER POST, Nov. 13, 1999, 1999 WL 27561751
(same); Paul Eng, An Innocent Company Gets Snared in an Anti-Spam Sweep, Bus. WK. ONLINE,
Dec. 17, 1998 (same), at http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/news/date/9812/
e981217.htm; Jason Krause, Anti-Spam Zealots Cross the Line, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 17,
1998 (same), http://www.thestandard.net/article/display/0,1151,2889,00.html; Lawrence
Lessig, The Spam Wars, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 31, 1999 (same), http://
www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,3006,00.html [hereinafter Lessig, Spam];
Paul McNamara, War on Spam Claims Legit E-mail, NETWORK WORLD, May 17, 1999, 1999 WL
11619735 (same). For a definition of "mailbombing," see infra note 68. For a definition of
"denial-of-service" attack, see infra note 66.
51. Response rates for spam generally are infinitesimal compared to other forms of
direct marketing. See, e.g., Posting of Robert Maynard, Robert.Maynard@goodparents.com,
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for the fact that few of the costs involved are incurred by the spam-
mers themselves. In most forms of communication, the sender exper-
iences significant and, usually, measurable costs. Therefore, the
sender usually has an incentive to compare the expected benefits of
the communication against these costs in deciding whether to pro-
ceed with the communication, and, in the case of an advertisement,
how broad or narrow a group of prospects to target. 52 E-mail changes
the entire equation because the cost of sending unsolicited bulk e-
mail is negligible. 53 Spammers, unlike senders of non-electronic com-
munications, have little incentive to consume resources in an efficient
manner.
Much of the concern over span arises because of the prospect
that its volume could increase exponentially in the future.54 Some of
the current responses to spam, such as deletion and filtering by recipi-
ents, could be rendered obsolete by such an expansion. 55 The cost
increases that would result from a massive increase in volume could
to news.admin.net-abuse.email, available at http://www.physics.helsinki.fi/-puolamak/
spam/maynard.txt (June 24, 1997) (citing response rate of zero in 100,000); Deborah
Scoblionkov, Politician Spams 5 Million Users, WIRED NEWS, June 29, 1998 (quoting a 22-year-
old local political candidate who spammed Internet users around the world as seeking a
response rate of one percent of one percent of one percent), at http://www.wired.com/
news/news/politics/story/13329.html; Wave 5 Mktg., Bulk and Opt-In Mail Lists: The Good
and the Bad, at http://www.wave5marketing.com/bulkemail.htm (last modified Sept. 20,
2000) (citing response rate of 0.1%).
52. Traditional advertisers calculate what it costs to place a commercial on a television
program, or to send a brochure to everyone on a mailing list, and weigh that against the
projected revenues of the ad campaign. A projected response rate of 2% may be sufficient
for a direct mail solicitation if the average net revenue per sale is $25 and the cost of
preparing and sending out the mailing is less than $0.50 per piece.
53. A spammer's costs include finding a cooperative or naive Internet service pro-
vider, figuring out how to send spam, composing the message text, and setting up a system
for receiving payment and processing orders. These costs generally are independent of the
volume of messages that is sent (or at the least, the marginal cost is negligible), and, there-
fore, the spammer has an incentive to send as many messages as humanly possible, with
little regard for the response rate or the costs borne by third parties.
54. See Sally Hambridge & Albert Lunde, Don't Spew: A Set of Guidelines for Mass Unsolic-
ited Mailings and Postings (Spam) (Request for Comments No. 2635), at 5, at http://www.isi.edu/
in-notes/rfc2635.txt (June 1999). In addition to an increase in the number of unsolicited
messages, the average size of each message is also likely to increase. Campaign messages e-
mailed on behalf of United States presidential candidate Steve Forbes in early 2000 in-
cluded a multimedia file that was nearly one megabyte in size. See Steve Forbes Aligns with
eCommercial.com to Create Next-Generation Video Internet Marketing Campaign Tool, Bus. WIRE,
Jan. 14, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File ("We look forward to leveraging eCom-
mercial's powerful video delivery to promote Steve Forbes' candidacy and to get his mes-
sage out, unfiltered, to the millions of voters who now use the Internet to get their
information.").
55. See discussion of filtering infta Part III.A.
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even lead many sites to discontinue supporting standard e-mail alto-
gether.56 Within a few years, e-mail may no longer be the near-univer-
sal method for communicating with people via the Internet that it is
today.
3. Threat to Internet Security
Spam is both a wasteful activity and one that poses a threat to the
security and reliability of Internet communications. For example, a
common practice by many spammers is the exploitation of "mail re-
lays." A third-party mail relay is when a spammer connects to a Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol ("SMTP") server operated by a third party,
where neither the spammer nor the recipients are local users, and
directs the server to send copies of a message to a long list of recipi-
ents.5 7 Many sites permit use of their servers only to messages sent to
or from their own users, but there are still many so-called "open" serv-
ers that lack such restrictions-17% in July 1999, according to one
survey, down from 36% a year earlier. 58
Spammers use open relays to disguise the origin of their
messages, to deflect complaints, to circumvent "spamblocking" by
other sites, and to increase the volume of messages they can send. 59
Third-party relaying usually represents theft of service because it is an
unauthorized appropriation of computing resources. Third-party re-
56. Admittedly, it is hard to envision the Internet without e-mail, but there are already
some signs that point in this direction. E-mail address harvesting by spammers has led
many people to replace "mailto" links on web pages with web-based response systems that
conceal one or both parties' e-mail addresses. See, e.g., FormMail.To/You!, at http://form-
mail.to/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Cameron Gregory, Spambot.com, at http://
www.spambot.com (last visited May 1, 2000); Memo.to, at http://memo.to/ (last visited Aug.
8, 2000); Response-O-Matic, at http://www.response-o-matic.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
Usenet articles frequently appear with fictitious, munged, or disposable addresses, and
some Usenet and mailing list archives obscure all e-mail addresses, also to frustrate harvest-
ing. See, e.g., eGroups: No Spa!, at http://www.egroups.com/info/nospam.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2000); Topica, Topica's Position on "Spai", at http://www.topica.com/pop/
spam.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); see infta note 121 and accompanying text (defining
"munge"). Many service providers now restrict even their own subscribers' access to e-mail
services, primarily because of abuse by third parties. See discussion infta note 109.
57. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 90-91; supra note 18 (discussing Sim-
ple Mail Transfer Protocol).
58. See Paul Hoffman, Allowing Relaying in SMTP: A Series of Surveys (Internet Mail Con-
sortium Report: UBE-RELAY IMCR-013), at http://www.imc.org/ube-relay.html (last modi-
fiedJuly 5, 1999). See generally Gunnar Lindberg, Anti-Spam Recommendations for SMTP MTAs
(Request for Comments No. 2505), at 2, at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2505.txt (Feb.
1999) (noting that "[e]ven if 99% of the SMTP [mail transfer agents] implemented [anti-
relay rules] from Day 1, spammers would still find the remaining 1% and use them").
59. See Hambridge & Lunde, supra note 54, at 4; Hoffman, supra note 58.
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laying consumes bandwidth and storage capacity and can result in per-
formance degradation and even system crashes. 60 The highest costs
usually are the staff time needed to deal with bounced messages, 61
complaints, and system reconfiguration. 62 A company's reputation
can also be damaged if it is associated with spam as a result of third-
party relaying. 63
Forgery of message headers is another tactic commonly used by
spammers. 64 Spam tends to generate a lot of complaints from irate
recipients, so spammers usually try to deflect those complaints by us-
ing a false return e-mail address in the message header, often com-
bined with a false "remove" address in the body of the message. 65 Web
sites that appear in spam through forgery may be entirely unrelated to
the sender of the spam, but often find themselves deluged with com-
plaints and even intentional denial-of-service attacks.66 There have
even been instances of spammers targeting anti-spammers by includ-
ing the domain names of anti-spammers in the spam as a reputation
attack.67
4. Other Consequences of Spare
Responses to spam can also be problematic. For example, web
sites that have been implicated in spamming-correctly or incor-
60. See Lindberg, supra note 58, at 2.
61. See Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, at http://
foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?bounceessage (last modified Nov. 29, 1994) (defin-
ing "bounce message" as "[a] notification message returned to the sender by a site unable
to relay e-mail to the intended recipient").
62. See Hambridge & Lunde, supra note 54, at 4; Hoffman, supra note 58.
63. SeeJuno Online Servs., Inc., Juno Sues E-mail Forgers in Fight Against Spam, at http://
help.juno.com/privacy/lawsuit/uno-sues.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2000).
64. "Forgery" in this context refers merely to the use of fictitious message headers; it
does not carry the same implications as the criminal sense of the term. See Seidl v. Green-
tree Mortgage Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1317 (D. Colo. 1998). Forgery of mail headers is
sometimes referred to as "e-mail spoofing." See CERT Coordination Ctr., Spoofed/Forged
Email, at http://www.cert.org/techtips/email-spoofing.html (last modified Mar. 20,
2000); IBM, Spamming Issues and Topics, at http://www.vm.ibm.com/related/tcpip/spam-
mc.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
65. See Hambridge & Lunde, supra note 54, at 2.
66. See, e.g., Neshevich, supra note 50 (describing denial-of-service attacks targeting a
company whose name appeared in spam, yet did not send any). For a definition of "denial-
of-service attack," see CERT Coordination Ctr., Denial of Service, at http://www.cert.org/
techtips/denial of service.html (last modified Feb. 12, 1999) ("A 'denial-of-service' at-
tack is characterized by an explicit attempt by attackers to prevent legitimate users of a
service from using that service.").
67. See Hambridge & Lunde, supra note 54, at 15.
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rectly-have been subjected to e-mail bombs68 and other attacks.69
Companies that provide services to spammers also can find themselves
under siege. 70
Individual users with no connection to spammers or spamfighters
are also affected by responses to spam. For example, many mobile
users rely on open relays for sending e-mail while connected from a
remote site, and restrictions on relaying make it harder for companies
to support such users. 71 Automated filtering and blocking tech-
niques,72 blackholing 73 of spam-friendly sites, and other responses to
spam also interfere with legitimate e-mail traffic.74
II. Informal Approaches
A. Self-Regulation: Netiquette and Acceptable Use Policies
Until about 1996, social pressures were the predominant ap-
proach used to combat spam. 75 Particularly in the early stages of the
68. Referred to as either an "e-mail bomb," a "mailbomb," or "mailbombing," this
practice refers "[t]o send[ing], or urg[ing] others to send, massive amounts of electronic
mail to a single system or person, with intent to crash or spain the recipient's system."
Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, at http://foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?query=mailbomb (last modified Apr. 4, 1995) (defining "mail bomb"). See, e.g.,
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(describing alleged mailbombing of spammer's ISP); Ed Foster, Spammers Get Aggressive:
Readers Report Threats and E-Mail Bomb Attacks, INFOWORLD, Apr. 10, 2000, at 114 (describing
mailbombing attacks by spammers against anti-sparn activists), http://www.infoworld.com/
articles/ op/xml/O/ 0/4/ 0 /OOO41Oopfoste r.xml; Karen Stuart, Teistra and Optus Blacklisted
by ORBS, INTERNETNEwS.COM, July 31, 2000 (citing claim that a major ISP accused of har-
boring spammers mailbombed people who submitted complaints), at http://
www.internetnews.com/intl-news/article/0,,6_425981,00.html.
69. See, e.g., Neshevich, supra note 50, Tim Richardson, Cisco Tells Spain Victims to Reply
with Abusive Emails, REG. (London), Apr. 4, 2000 (reporting recommendation, later re-
canted, that Internet users should retaliate against spammers by sending abusive e-mail
messages or by clogging their servers with massive files), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
content/archive/101 58.html.
70. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Info. Servs., Inc., No. 97-5931, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15344, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1996); SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra
note 2, at 179-81.
71. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 90.
72. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
73. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 and accompanying notes (discussing blackholing
and blackhole lists).
74. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75. The historical prevalence of informal remedies can be attributed in part to the
largely informal nature of Internet governance as a whole. See, e.g., David E. Sorkin, Revoca-
tion of an Internet Domain Name for Violations of "Netiquette". Contractual and Constitutional
Implications, 15 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 587, 595 (1997) (describing private
entities with influence and authority over the Internet). In addition, spam simply did not
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Internet, informal rules of netiquette and loosely applied acceptable
use policies prohibited or at least discouraged most commercial uses
of Internet resources. 76 Spam, and, to a lesser extent, all commercial
activity, had a substantial stigma attached to it, enough to dissuade
most Internet users from considering such activity.77
As commercial activities became generally accepted on the In-
ternet and ultimately far surpassed the volume of academic and re-
search usage, network rules and policies gradually began to focus on
more specific objectionable uses, including spam. Now, nearly all In-
ternet service providers ("ISPs") post clear policies prohibiting the use
of their facilities for sending spam. 78 Spammers and spam-friendly
providers increasingly find themselves blacklisted and boycotted,79
just as those who violate real-world norms may be criticized or
shunned by their peers.
Industry groups representing marketers and ISPs have attempted
to address the spam problem with self-regulatory efforts. For example,
members of the Direct Marketing Association ("DMA"), a trade associ-
ation that represents users and suppliers in the direct, database, and
interactive marketing field, must abide by the DMA's Privacy Promise
and are prohibited from sending unsolicited commercial e-mail
messages to addresses that appear in the DMA's e-Mail Preference Ser-
vice database.80 The Internet Alliance's "spamming guidelines" say
represent a significant problem until the mid-1990s, even though it was recognized as a
potential problem as early as 1975. See Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 74; Jon Postel,
On the Junk Mail Problem (Request for Comments No. 706), at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/
rfc706.txt (Nov. 1975).
76. A summary of generally accepted rules of netiquette appears in Sally Hambridge,
Netiquette Guidelines (Request for Comments No. 1855), at http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/
rfc1855.txt (Oct. 1995).
77. See Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 82.
78. A compilation of such policies is available at Whew.com!, ISP/Domain Acceptable
Use Policies/Terms of Service, at http://www.whew.com/Spammers/aup.shtml (last visited
Apr. 24, 2000).
79. See, e.g., Axel Boldt, Blacklist of Internet Advertisers, at http://math-www.uni-
paderborn.de/-axel/BL/blacklist.html (last modified Nov. 6, 2000); see also discussion in-fta Part III.A.3 and accompanying notes (discussing Realtime Blackhole List and similar
technical responses). Although such responses represent a form of social pressure, they are
treated in this Article primarily as a more formal technical response, since their effects on
spamming seem to result primarily from the architectural constraints that they impose
(i.e., actually blocking e-mail message traffic) rather than from the unfavorable publicity or
other social effects that they generate.
80. See 1999 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 49-50 (statement ofJerry Cerasale, Direct
Mktg. Ass'n); Direct Mktg. Ass'n, e-Mail Preference Service, at http://www.e-mps.org/ (last
visited Aug. 8, 2000); Direct Mktg. Ass'n, Privacy Promise Member Compliance Guide, at http://
www.the-dma.org/library/privacy/privacypromise.shtml (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
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that marketers should not collect e-mail addresses in online forums
for the purpose of sending unsolicited e-mail unless permitted to do
so by the forum. 81 The Association for Interactive Media ("AIM") has
stated its opposition to unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail, but has
not prohibited the practice.8 2
B. Problems with Self-Regulation
Yet informal responses like social pressure and industry self-regu-
lation have generally had little effect on spam. Spamming has always
been a fringe activity, and social pressures tend to be relatively ineffec-
tual against those at the fringes of society, be they stealth spammers
seeking relative obscurity or self-proclaimed "spam kings" flourishing
in their own notoriety.83 Furthermore, rules of netiquette generally
lack enforcement mechanisms, and ISPs have had little success in at-
tempting to impose their acceptable use policies upon those with
whom they are not in privity, such as spammers attempting to send e-
mail messages to their subscribers.8 4 It is true that a significant stigma
remains attached to the practice of spamming, and this stigma has
helped stem the tide of spare. 85 Most commercial users of the Internet
do not engage in spam, as much due to its stigma as because their own
ISPs happen to prohibit the practice. But the rapid expansion of e-
commerce has led more people to experiment with spam, and the
stigma appears to be diminishing.8 6 Voluntary industry efforts have
81. See Internet Alliance, IA Addresses Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail, at http://
www.internetalliance.org/policy/spamming-guidelines.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); cf.
Internet Alliance, Internet Alliance Sets Its Consumer E-Mail Agenda, at http://
www.internetalliance.org/news/000110.html (Jan. 10, 2000) (expressing support for "a
combined industry/public/government response" to spain, including "surgically crafted
legislation"). The DMA acquired the Internet Alliance (formerly the Interactive Services
Association) in 1999.
82. See Ass'n for Interactive Media, Responsible E-Mail Marketing: Resolutions Hailed at
Net.Marketing Conference in Seattle, at http://www.interactivehq.org/html/pr..pages_26.htm
(Feb. 29, 2000). AIM was acquired by the DMA in 1998.
83. See, e.g., Janet Kornblum, Spamford Speaks, CNET NEWS.GOM, Mar. 31, 1997 (profil-
ing Sanford Wallace, president of Cyber Promotions), at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-
1014-201-1474964-0.html.
84. See discussion infra Part IV.A.4 and accompanying notes.
85. See Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 82.
86. Self-regulation arguably has done little more then lessen the stigma attached to
spam. See, e.g., Ian Oxman, How the DMA Supports Spammers, DM NEWS, Nov. 29, 1999 ("The
only possible purpose of the E-MPS is to legitimize spamming."), at http://
www.dmnews.com/archive/1999-11-29/5463.html. Another likely contributor to the
destigmatization of spam is legislation that regulates spain without prohibiting it, such as
the statutes enacted in Nevada and several other states beginning in 1997. See Cranor &
LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 82; David E. Sorkin, Written Comment, Federal Trade Commission
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failed for many reasons, perhaps most importantly because they have
simply been ignored by most spammers, who have little reason to par-
ticipate in such efforts.8 7
III. Technical Approaches
The first line of defense against spain normally consists of self-
help and other technical mechanisms.88 These mechanisms can be
implemented by individual Internet users, ISPs and other destination
operators,89 as well as by various third parties, some of which special-
ize in battling spam.
A. Filtering and Blocking
1. End User Filtering
The easiest approach for individual end users is usually just to
ignore unwanted messages. Users may try to recognize unwanted
messages quickly-perhaps based upon an unfamiliar sender address,
or a subject line that contains an obvious solicitation-and delete
them without wasting much time reading them. Depending upon the
e-mail software9" being used, it may be possible to selectively delete
Public Workshop on Consumer Information Privacy, at 9, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/
wkshp97/comments2/sorkin.htm (Apr. 14, 1997). Indeed, many unsolicited commercial
e-mail messages now include claims of compliance with various statutes and unenacted
bills. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 50 ("Many [spammers] are citing the long-dead 'Murkow-
ski' amendment.. . as giving them the legal right to send unsolicited commercial e-mail.").
87. Although the Direct Marketing Association invites non-member companies to
purge their e-mail lists using the DMA's e-Mail Preference Service, it charges them a fee for
the privilege. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n, e-Mail Preference Service: Clean My List, at http://www.e-
mps.org/en/listsub-process.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2001). Even if there were no fee
and no effort involved in purging a list, there would be little reason for non-DMA members
to use the service. Indeed, it might even be reasonable for a spammer to expect the re-
sponse rate for e-mail addresses that appear in the e-MPS database to be higher than for
other addresses. See discussion infra note 130 (discussing opt-outs as prospects for subse-
quent solicitations).
88. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (noting that "the implementation of technological means of self-help, to the
extent that reasonable measures are effective,... should be exhausted before legal action
is proper").
89. A "destination operator" is "an organization or individual that maintains or con-
trols a service for recipients of email and for allowing recipients to access their mail using a
mail user agent." Paul Hoffman, Unsolicited Bulk Email: Definitions and Problems (Internet Mail
Consortium Report: UBE-DEF IMCR-004), at http://www.imc.org/ube-def.html (Oct. 5,
1997). The term includes consumer-oriented ISPs, free web-based e-mail providers, corpo-
rate e-mail networks, and other e-mail service providers. See id.
90. The word "software" is used rather loosely here; it includes the end user's e-mail
client software, the mail server software, the protocol used to access the server, and other
components of the system.
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unwanted messages on the server without having to download them
first. Most modern e-mail client software, such as Eudora and
Microsoft Outlook, includes automatic filtering capabilities, some of
which are specifically designed to identify and delete spam.91
Messages can be filtered based upon the headers of a message or its
full text and various spammer blacklists and spam archives can be
used to help identify spam.92
While most filtering techniques involve rejecting messages that
appear to be spam, it is also possible to reject all inbound messages
except those that can be recognized as legitimate. Thus, for example,
a recipient might accept only those messages with a header line saying
"this message is not spam,"' 93 or those accompanied by an electronic
payment.94 Nearly all filtering techniques result in false positives-le-
91. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 75-78.
92. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 (discussing blacklists).
93. In theory, it would seem to be more efficient (and less burdensome on legitimate
users) to require that spam include an affirmative statement that "this is spain," rather than
to require legitimate messages to include the negative statement. In either instance, spam-
mers would have an incentive to lie in order for their messages to get through-that is, to
omit the "this is spam" statement, or to include a false "this is not spare" statement. The
latter act might well be actionable under existing law, while new legislation would be
needed to induce spanmers to use affirmative labels.
Of course, the problem is much more complex than this summary analysis suggests.
For example, blocking of unlabeled messages would be impractical until labeling became
ubiquitous, and changes in most existing e-mail client software would be required to reach
this stage. Definitional questions regarding what constitutes spain or other classifications
subject to mandatory labeling must be addressed at the outset, and their resolution might
well vary over time and across jurisdictions. Labels could provide much more information.
For example, the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS") specification allows
labels to be associated with Internet content. See Platform for Internet Content Selection, at
http://www.w3.org/PICS/ (last modified June 14, 2000). However, PICS in its current
state does not support labeling of e-mail messages. See PICS, PICS Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQ), at http://www.w3.org/2000/03/PICS-FAQ/ (last modified Apr. 4, 2000). If PICS
did allow e-mail labeling, it would ameliorate the definitional concerns, but likely make the
solution more expensive and less effective. See generally Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick,
Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 427-28
(1999).
94. A variant of the "not spam" labeling idea would be to promote the inclusion of
electronic payments in e-mail messages. Recipients and destination operators could refuse
to accept messages not accompanied by sufficient payment, and recipients might choose to
return the payment upon verifying the legitimacy of a message. Payments could be mini-
mal-micropayments of a fraction of a cent per message, just enough to discourage large
bulk mailings-or substantial enough to compensate recipients for the time and resource
costs that they incur and possibly even provide funds for other purposes. See Lessig & Res-
nick, supra note 93, at 429; Sorkin, supra note 36, at 1031; Bob Metcalfe, E-Postage Would Not
Only Help Fund the System, but It Could Stop Spammers, INFOWORLD, Jan. 20, 1997, at http://
www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayNew.pl?/metcalfe/bm012097.htm; Bob Metcalfe, Pay-
os-We-Go Internet Puts Your Money Where Your Consumption Is, INFoWORLO, Sept. 21, 1998, at
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gitimate messages mistakenly identified as span.9 5 It therefore -may be
desirable to place apparent spam into a lower priority channel rather
than deleting it automatically,96 but this approach obviously lessens
the value of filtering as a solution since the spam has already been
delivered. 97
Filtering algorithms cannot detect all sparn, so spammers have an
incentive to structure their messages in a way that defeats automated
filters, such as using false domain names or generic or personalized
subject lines, for example. Furthermore, many individual users lack
the sophistication necessary to implement filters effectively. Client-
based filters generally do not eliminate the need to download each
message before deciding whether to delete it-much of the damage is
already done by the time the filter has an opportunity to do its job.
2. Collaborative Filtering by Third Parties
Filtering by' ISPs and third-party proxy filtering services like
Brightmail can be more effective than end user filtering, requiring
less effort and expertise on the part of the users. For example, an ISP
can block all traffic originating from a known spanmer and may coop-
erate with other providers in identifying spammers. Individuals can
have their incoming e-mail routed through a third-party proxy service
that attempts to filter out spam. 98 One advantage to these technolo-
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayNew.pl?/metcalfe/980921bm.htm; Victoria
Shannon, Sending E-Mail and Paying Postage?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 17, 1998, 1998 WL
4794101. But the e-postage approach shares most of the problems of labeling, and carries
with it substantial overhead costs, not to mention the likelihood of substantial resistance
among Internet users.
95. Another potential drawback of filtering and related approaches is the effect that
they can have on legitimate users of anonymous and pseudonymous remailers, free web-
based e-mail services like Hotmail, and e-mail "greeting card" services. Users of these ser-
vices may find their communications blocked or filtered for no apparent reason, either
because others have abused the services or, in some instances, because the services have
been falsely associated with spam. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint, Hartford House, Ltd. v.
Microsoft Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998) (No. CV778550) (alleging that Microsoft's e-
mail software improperly filters or blocks plaintiffs electronic greeting cards by designat-
ing them as junk mail), http://wwwl.blttemountain.com/home/bluemountain vs_
Microsoft.html; George William Herbert, Greeting Card Websites and Spain, at http://mail-
abuse.org/gcrbl.html (last modified July 20, 2000).
96. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 18.
97. Prioritization of incoming messages does little to address the bandwidth and stor-
age capacity problems caused by spam, and periodic manual review of putative spam is still
necessary to minimize the risk of deleting legitimate messages. See id. (discussing the
Hotmail inbox filter which places e-mail addressed to the user in the "BCC" header into a
bulk mail folder for the user to sort through).
98. Brightmail now offers such a service to individuals at no charge. See Brightmail,
Eree Brightmail, at http://www.brightmail.com/individual/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
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gies is that they are more likely to stop spam before it even reaches the
end user's e-mail inbox. More importantly, the collaborative filtering
employed by these approaches can be much more effective than indi-
vidual filtering since it permits identification of multiple identical cop-
ies of a message that otherwise might not be obvious as spam, except
to human eyes. 99 However, collaborative filtering introduces other po-
tential inefficiencies into the system, such as requiring circuitous rout-
ing, examination of messages, and a high level of trust in the ISP or
third-party proxy service that is given access to the client's e-mail.
Even when performed by a destination operator rather than by
end users, filtering is still an inefficient solution since the destination
operator and intermediate networks still must devote bandwidth and
storage capacity to receiving the message. It would be more efficient if
the destination operator could refuse delivery of spam altogether or,
better yet, if the spam could be prevented from reaching the destina-
tion operator in the first place. 100
3. Blocking Spam
Several technological measures have been developed to enable
destination operators to refuse delivery of spam. Many databases,
sometimes referred to as blacklists or "blackhole lists," list Internet
hosts frequented by spammers. 10 1 Destination operators can use these
99. Brightmail, for example, plants decoy e-mail addresses in various places on the
Internet to be "harvested" unwittingly by spammers. The company's spam-filtering rules
are based largely on messages received at these decoy addresses. See Paul Festa, Are New
Yahoo, Hotmail Spam Filters Better Than Past Efforts?, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 8, 1999, at http:/
/news.cnet.com/category/0-1005-200-1488576.html. The Spam Recycling Center collects
spam specimens submitted by individuals and forwards them to government officials and
spam-filter developers. See Spam Recycling Center, at http://chooseyourmail.com/
spamindex.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000).
100. These approaches are similar to refusing delivery of a certified letter based upon
its return address (although perhaps a C.O.D. package would be a closer analogy) or in-
structing the postal service not to deliver any mail from a particular source. Because In-
ternet e-mail is not routed through a central agency (unlike postal mail), there generally is
no choke point at which e-mail can be stopped between the origination and destination
networks. However, many efforts at stopping spain represent attempts to prevent messages
from leaving the origination network in the first place. For the most part, these efforts fall
within the categories of informal and legal responses, although some Internet service prov-
iders have implemented a partial technical solution by limiting outbound SMTP traffic. See
infra note 109 (discussing port 25 blocking and redirection).
101. The term "blackholing" means denying delivery of any e-mail, or other data, com-
ing from a certain Internet host, without returning a bounce message. The destination
operator blocks the data coming from the blacklisted ISP and the data disappears without
a trace, falling into a "blackhole." See Jargon 4.2, at http://www.science.uva.nl/-mes/
jargon/b/blackhole.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2001) (defining "blackhole"); see supra note
61 (defining "bounce message").
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databases to identify and refuse delivery of selected incoming
messages.' 0 2 The best known such database, the Mail Abuse Preven-
tion System's Realtime Blackhole List ("RBL") ,103 includes open re-
lays,10 4 as well as other sites that are deemed "friendly, or at least
neutral, to spammers. ' 10 5 About one-third of all destination operators
reportedly subscribe to the RBL. 10 6 Similar databases include the Re-
lay Spam Stopper, 10 7 the Open Relay Behaviour-modification Sys-
tem,' 08 the Dial-up User List, 109 and the Spamhaus Project.' 10 A
102. See, e.g., Paul Festa, Hotmail Uses Controversial Filter to Fight Spam, CNET NEWS.COM,
Nov. 9, 1999, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1433577.html. Destination opera-
tors can choose how to use these lists-for example, some sites accept messages from listed
hosts but filter them into a folder containing suspected spam, while others may refuse
connectivity for both incoming and outgoing e-mail traffic. See, e.g., id.; Using ORBS to Pro-
tect Your E-mail, at http://www.orbs.org/usingindex.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Paul
Vixie, MAPS RBL Usage, at http://www.mail-abuse.org/rbl/usage.html (last modified July
3, 2000).
103. Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, MAPS Realtime Blackhole List, at http://www.mail-
abuse.org/rbl/ (last modified Feb. 28, 2000).
104. See discussion supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying notes (discussing third-party
relaying).
105. Paul Vixie & Nick Nicholas, Getting into the MAPS RBL, at http://www.mail-
abuse.org/rbl/candidacy.html (last modified Feb. 2, 2000). There are a number of
grounds on which a host may be added to the RBL, including operating an open mail
relay, hosting web pages or e-mail drop boxes that are promoted in spam, and providing
other services or software for use in spamming. See id.
106. See Derek Scruggs & Heidi Anderson, Sometimes the Messenger Should Be Shot: Build-
ing a Spam-Free E-mail Marketing Program, at 8, at http://www.messagemedia.com/rc/
spam.PDF (Dec. 3, 1999) (reporting that nearly a third of mail administrators subscribe to
the RBL); Michelle Finley, Other Ways to Fry Spam, WIRED NEws, Apr. 24, 2000 (quoting
claim by SpamCop operator Julian Haight that 30% to 40% of mail servers participate in
the RBL), at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,35776-2,00.html; Nick
Wingfield, MAPS Can Be a Roadblock to E-Mail Access, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2000, at B5 (citing
claim by MAPS project manager that "MAPS's subscribers control upward of 40% of the e-
mail accounts on the Internet").
107. Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, MAPS Relay Spam Stopper, at http://www.mail-
abuse.org/rss/ (last modified Aug. 1, 2000).
108. Open-Relay Behaviour-modification System, at http://www.orbs.org/ (last visited Aug.
8, 2000).
109. Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, MAPS Dial-up User List, at http://www.mail-
abuse.org/dul/ (last modified Aug. 1, 2000). Unlike most of the other databases men-
tioned here, the Dial-up User List contains Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses normally
assigned to personal computers when they connect to the Internet by dialing into an ISP.
Internet users with dial-up access normally send e-mail by configuring their client software
to use their ISP's SMTP server, while a spammer may be more likely to bypass its ISP's
server. See discussion supra note 18. Some ISPs have responded to this technique by block-
ing outbound traffic on port 25 (the port used to send e-mail via SMTP), or by redirecting
such traffic to their own SMTP servers. See Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC, MAPS DUL
Response to BYTE Column by Jason and Ted Coombs, at http://mail-abuse.org/dul/
0405coombs-response.htm (last modifiedJuly 31, 1999); cf Scott Bradner, BlockingData for
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separate blacklist, Spam Whack!,1 11 helps ISPs identify potential sub-
scribers who have been terminated by other ISPs for spamming. 12
The operators of the RBL and similar databases have been threatened
with lawsuits, though they appear eager to defend their activities in
court. 11 3 While it is difficult to argue that an individual company
should not have the right to block spam,114 persuasive arguments can
be raised concerning widely used databases like the RBL.115
Unfortunately, none of the filtering and blocking technologies
are perfect: most of them cost money to implement on a widespread
basis, interfere with some legitimate message traffic, allow some spam
through, and fail to eliminate many of the costs imposed by spam.
Advances in filtering and blocking technology thus far seem to have
a Good Cause, NETWORK WORLD,June 7,1999,1999 WL 11619858 (recommending that ISPs
remove such restrictions from subscriber accounts after a probationary period).
110. The Spamhaus Project, at http://www.spamhaus.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). The
Spamhaus blacklists focus on ISPs that host support services used by spammers.
111. Spain Whack!, at http://www.spamwhack.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
112. See id.
113. See Paul Vixie & Nick Nicholas, How to Sue MAPS, at http://mail-abuse.org/law-
suit/ (last modified Feb. 29, 2000). MAPS was actually named as a defendant in two law-
suits filed in July 2000-a suit brought by opt-in e-mail marketer YesMail.com was quickly
settled, with MAPS agreeing not to add YesMail.com to the RBL, while MAPS was named as
a co-defendant along with AOL and other ISPs that subscribe to the RBL in a similar case
brought by pollster Harris Interactive. See Wingfield, supra note 106, at B5 (discussing Har-
ris Interactive Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 00-CV-6364LF (W.D.N.Y. filed July 31, 2000));
Jessica Madore Fitch, E-Mail Marketer Fights "Spam" Label, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 25, 2000,
2000 WL 6686599 (discussing the case brought by YesMail); Laurie J. Flynn, Harris Files Suit
Against AOL Over Blocking of E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/08/biztech/articles/O3spam.html.
114. Many companies have asserted this right to block incoming spam. See, e.g., Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999)
(enjoining defendant from sending bulk messages protesting plaintiff's employment prac-
tices into plaintiff's e-mail system), appealfiled, No. C033076 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000);
Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 1999); CompuServe, Inc.
v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v.
Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996). But see Hartford House, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No.
CV778550 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 1999) (order modifying preliminary injunction) (en-
joining Microsoft from incorporating junk mail filters into its Outlook e-mail programs
that filter or block plaintiff's electronic greeting cards), http://www.bluemountain.com/
home/order021899.html; Microsoft, Microsoft to Remove Popular Filtering Feature From Outlook
Express In Light of California Court Order, at http://www.microsoft.com/PressPass/bluemt/
bluemtnpr.asp (Feb. 24, 2000).
115. See, e.g., David A. Gottardo, Comment, Commercialism and the Downfall of Internet Self
Governance: An Application of Antitrust Law, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 125
(1997); Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note 8, at 546 (describing blacklisting as "a form of
vigilanteism"); Krause, supra note 50; Lessig, Span, supra note 50.
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been matched by advances by spammers in circumventing such
measures.
B. Hiding from Spammers
Just as an unlisted telephone number can help reduce the num-
ber of telemarketing solicitations that one receives, Internet users can
reduce the amount of spam that they receive by making it harder for
spammers to learn their e-mail addresses. It is also possible to request
that a spammer remove a particular e-mail address from its list, al-
though this approach tends to be ineffective and even
counterproductive. 116
Address concealment has become an increasingly common prac-
tice, largely because of spam.117 Spammers frequently compile mail-
ing lists by "harvesting" e-mail addresses from web pages, Usenet
newsgroups, chat rooms, and public directories and profiles available
on services like America Online." 8 Individuals who post to new-
sgroups and those whose addresses appear on web pages tend to re-
ceive more spam as a result.11 9
Hiding one's e-mail address from spammers can be an effective
way to reduce spain, but it is impractical for Internet users who want
to remain open to other communications, both solicited and unsolic-
ited. Some people include anti-spam statements in places where they
post their e-mail addresses in an effort to warn off spammers, 120
though it seems unlikely that such statements would even be noticed
by automated harvesting techniques. A more common technique is to
disguise, or "munge," 121 one's address-for example, by inserting
"nospam" or other characters-so that the correct address can be de-
termined by other individuals, but not by address-harvesting
116. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 99.
117. See generally id. at 66-74 (discussing how users can hide their e-mail addresses from
spammers).
118. See id. at 66; Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 75.
119. See Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 77.
120. See, e.g., Emailing Leaf at http://www.gweep.net/~leaf/nospam.html (last modi-
fied July 13, 2000). But see Michael Roeder, Spam Offer by Michael Roeder to Senders of Unin-
vited Email Solicitations, at http://www.infernosoft.com/spamoff.shtml (last modified May
26, 2000) (offering to receive e-mail solicitations for $10 per message); Nima Taradji, Notice
of Offer to Receive Unsolicited Advertising (Spam), at http://www.taradji.com/spam.html (last
modified June 3, 1999) (offering to receive e-mail solicitations for $500 per message).
121. See W.D. Baseley, Address MungingFAQ: Spain-Blocking Your EmailAddress, at http://
members.aol.com/emailfaq/mungfaq.html (last modified Aug. 8, 1999); Jargon 4.2, at
http://www.science.uva.nl/-mes/jargon/s/spamblock.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2000)
(defining "spamblock").
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software.' 22 Internet users can also maintain multiple e-mail ac-
counts123 and use web-based response services1 24 as methods of con-
cealing their e-mail addresses from spammers, while still providing
other people with a means of contacting them. 125
122. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 69-70; Baseley, supra note 121.
123. Free e-mail services such as Hotmail are frequently used to obtain secondary or
even disposable addresses, both by individuals who want to avoid spain and by spammers
themselves. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 67, 118. There are even services
that offer e-mail addresses containing phrases such as "do-not-spain" and "suespammers."
See, e.g., Do-Not-Spam.com, at http://do-not-spam.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Tom Gel-
ler, Suespammers.org E-Mail Accounts, at http://www.suespammers.org/pop3/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2000).
Multiple e-mail accounts can also be used in tandem to help filter spam from legiti-
mate e-mail messages. See, e.g., Brightmail, Free Brightmail, at http://www.brightmail.com/
individual/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); MsgTo.com, at http://www.msgto.com/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2000). The approach taken by MsgTo.com is particularly interesting: The first time
that someone attempts to send e-mail to a MsgTo.com user, the service responds by asking
the sender to pass a simple test by clicking on a specified word within an image before
letting the message through. See MsgTo.com, How It Works, at http://www.msgto.com/
works.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). MsgTo.com has since suspended its service. See
MsgTo.com, Au Revoir, at http://www.msgto.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2000).
124. Freedback.com and Response-O-Matic are among several services that offer feed-
back forms that people can place on their web pages. A web page visitor who fills out and
submits the form will cause a single e-mail message to be sent to the web page owner. See
Freedback.com, at http://www.freedback.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Response-O-Matic, at
http://www.response-o-matic.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). With these and some other
feedback forms, the web page owner's e-mail address must be included in the web page
HTML code-and thus remains vulnerable to harvesting. A similar service, FormMail.To/
You!, addresses this concern by maintaining a database containing each registered user's e-
mail address rather than requiring that it be embedded in the feedback form. See Form-
Mail. To/You!, at http://formmail.to (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
125. Another measure that has been used to combat address harvesting is the posting
of web pages containing very long lists of bogus e-mail addresses (or e-mail addresses of
spammers, government officials, or both), intended to frustrate harvesters by filling their
lists with invalid or non-responsive addresses. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at
73; see, e.g., Christopher B. Browne, Spam Bait, at http://www.ntlug.org/-cbbrowne/comm-
spambait.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Ian Chadwick, Spam Bot Trap/Bait Page, at http://
www.georgian.net/rally/trap.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); E-Scrub Technologies,
Wpoison Web Poisoning Tool, at http://www.monkeys.com/wpoison/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2000); David Harper & Lynne Marie Stockman, Welcome, Hungry Spambots, at http://
www.obliquity.com/computer/spambait/ (last modified July 13, 2000); Greg Sabino Mul-
lane, Spambot Beware, at http://www.turnstep.com/Spambot/ (last modified Dec. 19,
1999); Chip Rosenthal, Spambait, at http://www.unicom.com/spambait/ (last modified
July 3, 2000). However, some harvesting software apparently can recognize these pages. See,
e.g., Microsys Technologies, Inc., Atomic Harvester 2000: Professional Email Address Harvesting
for Windows 98, at http://www.emailtools.com/products/ah2000/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2000). In any event, the negligible incremental cost of sending e-mail makes this technique
unlikely to have a significant impact.
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C. Opting Out
Once spammers obtain an e-mail address and begin sending
messages to it, however, it is much more difficult to stem the tide of
spam. Some people reply to spam with an "opt-out" request, asking
the sender not to send any further messages and to remove the per-
son's e-mail address from its mailing list. Unsolicited commercial e-
mail messages commonly include opt-out instructions, including an e-
mail address or web page's uniform resource locator ("URL") for use
in submitting such requests. Such e-mail addresses and URLs often
are invalid, or become so once the spam is reported, and the spam-
mer's service provider discontinues its service. 126
Opting out is relatively effective in other forms of direct market-
ing, namely direct mail solicitation and outbound telemarketing, at
least with respect to each marketer to which an opt-out request is sub-
mitted. 27 In direct mail and telemarketing, the incremental cost of
each communication provides marketers with a sufficient incentive to
refrain from communication with persons who have submitted opt-out
requests. 128 Bulk e-mail, however, does not involve an analogous incre-
mental cost, and spammers, therefore, lack a similar incentive to re-
spect opt-out requests.129 Furthermore, many experts advise Internet
users not to submit opt-out requests since they are rarely effective and
126. The Direct E-Mail Advertisers Association, which appears to be a trade organiza-
tion representing companies that send unsolicited commercial e-mail, makes the rather
ironic claim that such service terminations are counterproductive since they make it more
difficult for recipients to be removed from mailing lists. See Direct E-Mail Advertisers Ass'n,
The Comparison: UCE vs. Spam!, at http://www.deaa.org/uce-vs-spam.shtml (last visited
Aug. 8, 2000).
127. See Sorkin, supra note 36, at 1029.
128. Postage, materials, and labor costs all contribute to the significant incremental
costs of direct mail and telemarketing solicitations; a marketer might well save as much as
one dollar or more by eliminating a name from its list. Furthermore, the legal conse-
quences of continuing to communicate with an individual who has sought to discontinue
receiving solicitations are also likely to influence a direct mailer or telemarketer's actions.
See, e.g., Rowan v. United States, 397 U.S. 728, 735-36, 739 n.6 (1970) (interpreting prohib-
itory order statute as conferring unfettered, unreviewable discretion upon the addressee to
determine what advertisements qualify as pandering); 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1994) (requiring
postal service to issue prohibitory order to mailer upon addressee's request, following re-
ceipt of "pandering advertisement," and requiring mailer to purge addressee's name from
its mailing lists); 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b) (1999) (requiring telemarketers to honor "do-not-
call" requests); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(vi) (1999) (same).
129. The effort required to remove an address from a spammer's list is likely to exceed
any negligible savings that would result from sending a bulk e-mail message to one fewer
address. Furthermore, a spammer typically must violate several providers' policies by send-
ing the spam in the first place, so it makes sense that spammers would be less likely than
other marketers to be concerned with social or legal consequences of ignoring opt-out
requests.
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some spammers reportedly collect and sell e-mail addresses of those
who have submitted such requests. 130 Finally, sender-specific opt-out is
problematic in the case of e-mail because the sheer number of poten-
tial spammers far exceeds the number of direct marketers using other
communication methods.131 For these reasons, sender-specific opt-out
represents a singularly ineffective method of curbing spam.
A universal opt-out system would require spammers to use a sin-
gle "global remove" list to filter addresses from their mailing lists. 132
There have been several attempts to develop such a system, but nearly
all have failed miserably,1 33 and the prospect of creating a true univer-
130. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 74. Individuals who have submitted
opt-out requests may not seem like particularly good prospects for a subsequent solicita-
tion. However, the fact that they have responded to a spam confirms their addresses to be
valid, and indicates that they are probably more likely to actually read unsolicited e-mail,
that they probably receive less of it than many other users, and that they may be relatively
unsophisticated Internet users and, therefore, more susceptible to questionable
solicitations.
131. The ephemeral nature of identity on the Internet effectively gives each spammer
an unlimited stock of separate identities, some of which may exist only at the point in time
that a particular solicitation is being sent, and as already noted, spammers have little or no
incentive to honor opt-out requests. Unsolicited e-mail messages frequently contain state-
ments representing that they are a one-time mailing and promising never to contact the
recipient again, often as an justification for not providing opt-out instructions, and the
spammer naturally will send its next message out under a different name. For these rea-
sons, even if there were very few separate entities engaged in spamming, contacting a sig-
nificant proportion of spammers is likely to be much more difficult than contacting a
comparable proportion of direct mailers or telemarketers.
132. Both caller-specific and universal opt-out systems have been implemented by laws
that govern telemarketing. Under federal law, each company that engages in telemarket-
ing activities must maintain a "do-not-call" list. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) (vi) (1999). A
few states prohibit telemarketers from calling persons who are listed in a central "do-not-
call" registry, sometimes called "black dot" or "asterisk" laws. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.50.475(b), (c) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-99-404 to -405 (Michie Supp.
1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(3), (4) (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-27(d),
(e) (Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46955(15) (Banks-Baldwin 1999); Act ofJuly 8,
1999, ch. 564, § 1, 1999 Or. Laws 1317, 1317 (to be codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 646.569).
133. In some instances, spammers have reportedly operated opt-out services as a tactic
to obtain additional e-mail addresses; in other cases, apparently good-faith attempts to cre-
ate universal exclusion lists have been terminated by their operators because spammers
referred to the lists in their messages and used them to justify the practice of spamming.
See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 74; Tactical Net Abuse FAQ ver. 1.4, at http://
members.aol.com/macabrus/tacticalfaq.html (last modified Jan. 19, 1998) (describing
universal remove lists as "[t]he oldest trick in the spammer's handbook"); Do-Not-
Spam.com, Global Remove, at http://do-not-spam.com/remove.htm (last visited Aug. 8,
2000) (explaining temporary removal of removal service "as it has been falsely and mali-
ciously used against our wishes in unsolicited advertising via e-mail"). One service even
charges individuals a fee to be included in its "remove" database. See NoThankYou.com, at
http://www.nothankyou.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
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sal list raises significant administrative and privacy concerns. 34 Even if
such a list could be constructed, it would be unlikely to have a signifi-
cant effect on spam unless spammers were legally compelled to use it.
D. Reporting and Retaliation
Another category of technical responses involves complaints and
other retaliatory actions directed at spammers by spain recipients.'- 5
An Internet user who receives spam with a bogus reply address may be
sufficiently incensed to trace the message and complain to the spam-
mer's service provider, the user's own ISP, and elsewhere.' 36 Such
complaints may be motivated by revenge or a desire to vent frustra-
Two recent attempts at universal opt-out systems have fared somewhat better, but
neither appears likely to have a significant effect on spam. The first, SAFEeps, went online
in 1998 and quickly grew to include millions of e-mail addresses-in large part because it
permitted services like America Online and Hotmail to opt-out all of their subscribers'
addresses-but apparently is rarely used by spammers to filter their mailing lists. See
SAFEeps, at http://www.safeeps.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Andrew Leonard, The War
for Your E-Mail Box, SALON, Oct. 30, 1998, at http://www.salon.com/21st/feature/1998/
10/cov_30feature.html; Deborah Scoblionkov, Direct Mail Double-Cross?, SALON, Nov. 12,
1999, at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/1l/12/spam/. In 1998, the Direct
Marketing Association promised to create a universal opt-out system and the operator of
SAFEeps offered to license that system to the DMA for $1. See Nick Nicholas, DMA to In-
ternet: Shut UP and Eat Your Spare, at http://www.mail-abuse.org/anti-dma.html (last modi-
fied Feb. 28, 2000). The DMA declined this offer, apparently because of hostility to the
concept of domain-wide opt-out. See id. Instead, it developed its own system, e-MPS, which
went online in 2000. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n, e-Mail Preference Service, at http://www.e-
mps.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000). The DMA requires its members to filter their spam
mailing lists using e-MPS and permits other spammers to do so for a fee. See id.
134. Furthermore, since nearly all Internet users would prefer not to receive an unlim-
ited amount of spam and nearly all destination operators have policies that prohibit spam
from being sent to their subscribers, and, therefore, possibly requiring their subscribers to
opt out, it would seem much more efficient to construct an opt-in list comprised of a few
dozen addresses than an opt-out list comprised of nearly all Internet users. To a lesser ex-
tent, the same could be said for telemarketing, although there probably is a much larger
proportion of the public that enjoys receiving telemarketing calls. For example, those who
like talking to strangers on the telephone and those who enjoy dispensing verbal abuse.
Also, the volume of telemarketing calls that a person is likely to receive is significantly
constrained by economic factors, unlike the volume of spam.
135. In some instances, destination operators have also engaged in retaliatory tactics.
See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 & n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1996). But these appear to be much less common than acts of retaliation by individual
recipients.
136. See Phil Agre, How to Complain About Spam, or, Put a Spammer in the Slammer, at
http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/spam.html (Dec. 1997); Jim Kingdon, How to
Complain to the Spammer's Provider, at http://spam.abuse.net/spam/howtocomplain.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2000). Axel Boldt's Blacklist of Internet Advertisers cites to several public
fora in which spammers are vilified. See Boldt, supra note 79.
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tion, but they can help alleviate the spam problem by imposing costs
upon spammers and threatening their Internet connectivity.
Frequently, however, tracing spam can be quite difficult; in addi-
tion to forging message headers, spammers omit other contact infor-
mation such as telephone numbers and physical addresses.1 37 They
may invite recipients to access a web site, usually one that is hosted by
a spain-friendly provider, or may solicit responses only by means de-
signed to discourage or screen complaints, such as a "bulletproof'
voice mail number.13 8
Internet users can choose from several services and tools de-
signed to assist them in tracing and reporting spam. Sam Spade, for
example, is a collection of utilities that can help users decipher ad-
dresses and related information contained in e-mail messages. 39 A
web-based service called SpamCop automatically parses message head-
ers and generates complaint messages to appropriate parties on the
user's behalf.140
Retaliation can go far beyond merely the complaint stage. Spam-
mers and their service providers have been subjected to flames,' 4 1 rep-
utation attacks, invasions of privacy, e-mail bombs and other denial-of-
service attacks, and even threats of violence and property damage. 42
Such extreme retaliatory acts may well be somewhat effective in deter-
ring spam, but they obviously have problems of their own.
137. See generally SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 86-99.
138. One such service, for example, advertises that it identifies the telephone number
of each caller and can limit the number of calls accepted from each number, presumably
in order to control the usage charges incurred in receiving complaints about spam. See
Freedomstarr Communications Inc., Bulletproof' 800/888# Voicemail Instructions and FAQ, at
http://www.voicemail.org/faq.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
139. See Steve Atkins, Sam Spade, at http://www.samspade.org/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2000); Bill Machrone, Digital Sam Spade Takes on the Spam Gang, PC WK., June 15, 1998,
http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/opinion/0615/15mach.html. Ultradesign Xperimental
Network, UXN Spam Combat, at http://combat.uxn.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000), is a
similar set of utilities.
140. SeeJulian Haight, SpamCop, at http://spamcop.net/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
141. See Denis Howe ed., Free On-Line Dictionary of Computing, at http://
foldoc.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?flame (last modified May 27, 1998) (defining
"flame" as "[a]n electronic mail or Usenet news message intended to insult, provoke or
rebuke, or the act of sending such a message" or "[t]o speak incessantly and/or rabidly on
some relatively uninteresting subject or with a patently ridiculous attitude or with hostility
towards a particular person or group of people").
142. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing "Anti-Spam Vigi-
lantes"); Michael Castelluccio, Spam and Cheese?, MGMT. Accr., Feb. 1999, at 82 (noting that
"vigilantes have published the names, voicemail numbers, home addresses, and social se-
curity numbers of spammers"); Amy Harmon, The American Way of Spam, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1998, at GI; Agre, supra note 136.
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E. Limitations of Technical Approaches
While technological measures are the most flexible approach to
spain, spammers have consistently succeeded in adapting their tech-
niques to circumvent advances in anti-spain technology. Technical ap-
proaches are unlikely ever to eradicate spain, partly because of the
time and resources that spammers devote to their activities (and the
economies of scale from which they benefit) and partly because of the
inherent openness of the Internet and e-mail protocols.' 43
Another problem with technical approaches is the deleterious ef-
fects that they can have on legitimate communications. Blocking e-
mail traffic from a spain-friendly site often means blocking a great
deal of legitimate e-mail, for example. Closing down an open relay
that has been used for sending spain as well as for legitimate purposes
can be inconvenient for many users.
The costs of implementing technical mechanisms is also of great
concern. 144 Spamming is profitable only because spammers are almost
entirely unaffected by these substantial costs.
Finally, technical approaches have been criticized for a lack of
transparency and accountability. Blacklist maintainers, for example,
need not disclose the criteria they use nor afford due process to ac-
cused spammers. The market does provide a check on such activity,
but incomplete information, complexity of the issues, and concentra-
tion of market power 145 all affect the extent to which blacklists and
other anti-spain measures are likely to be held accountable.
IV. Legal Approaches
Many lawsuits involving unsolicited e-mail have been filed in re-
cent years, and a number of them have been successful. 146 Most of the
cases brought to date, however, involve instances of what might be
considered "aggravated" spamming-sending messages with forged
headers, unauthorized third-party relaying, and persistent refusals to
comply with opt-out demands-and nearly all involve commercial
143. This openness is frequently desirable-for example, relatively few Internet users
are interested in receiving e-mail only from persons they have designated in advance, and
there are legitimate and important applications for anonymous electronic
communications.
144. See sources cited supra note 48 (discussing the costs imposed by spare).
145. But see Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that AOL is not likely to be proven an "essential facility" despite its substan-
tial market share).
146. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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messages. 47 It stands to reason that more extreme forms of spam are
more likely to lead to litigation, but the resulting cases have done little
to clarify the legal status of "pure" spam.
Meanwhile, legislatures have been busy considering a variety of
legislative approaches to controlling spam, at both state and -federal
levels. Several spam-related bills have been introduced in the United
States Congress, 148 and many states have already enacted spam legisla-
tion, 149 including, in at least one instance, a virtual ban on unsolicited
bulk commercial e-mail messages.' 50 The European Union and other
countries have also considered enacting anti-spam legislation. 151
A. Litigation
The first spam-related lawsuit was a small claims case filed by Rob-
ert Arkow against CompuServe in early 1995.152 Arkow had received
unsolicited e-mail advertisements from CompuServe. 53 He argued
that the federal law prohibiting unsolicited facsimile advertise-
ments15 4 defined "facsimile machine" broadly enough to include com-
puters that send and receive electronic mail. 155 The parties settled out
of court and the terms were never disclosed.' 56 Thus, the applicability
of the law governing the use of facsimile machines to e-mail has never
been formally adjudicated.1 57
147. See id.
148. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
149. See id.
150. See Act ofJuly 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 7 (1999) (to be codified at DEL.
CODE tit. 11, § 937(a)).
151. See discussion of European legislation infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
152. See Sorkin, supra note 36, at 1002 n.12; Bruce V. Bigelow, Infuriated Client Sues Over
Junk E-mail, SAN DIEGO SUN TRIB., Feb. 19, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, San Diego Sun
Tribune News File; Mark Eckenwiler, Just the Fax, Ma'am, at http://www.panix.com/-eck/
junkmail.html (Mar. 1996) (discussing Arkow's suit against CompuServe filed in February
1995).
153. See Bigelow, supra note 152.
154. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
155. See Eckenwiler, supra note 152.
156. See Sorkin, supra note 36, at 1002 n.12.
157. See Eric J. Sinrod & Barak D. Jolish, Controlling Chaos: The Emerging Law of Privacy
and Speech in Cyberspace, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15 n.102 at http://stlr.stanford.edu/
STLR/Articles/99_STLRl/articlepdf.pdf. See generally Sorkin, supra note 36, at 1032
(concluding that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act is not likely to be construed to
cover e-mail advertisements). The issue has been raised in other cases, but apparently has
yet to be addressed on its merits. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513,
520 (3d Cir. 1998) (dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction); Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage Co., 30
F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. Colo. 1998) (claim brought but not discussed by the court);
Snow v. Doherty, No. 3:97-CV-0635 (RM) (N.D. Ind. filed Sept. 22, 1997) (case dismissed
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There have been relatively few spain-related suits involving indi-
vidual recipients of span since Arkow v. CompuServe.15s Most spam liti-
gation has been brought by ISPs and other destination operators that
have received large quantities of spain addressed to their users, or by
third parties whose names or resources have been appropriated by
spammers.1 59
without prejudice for the inability to obtain a valid address for service of process); Docket
History, at http://mama.indstate.edu/users/dougie/docket.txt (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
158. The dearth of individual actions is probably attributable in part to the relatively
small damages that would likely be available, together with the difficulty in proving actual
damages. ISPs are often in a better position than end users to demonstrate substantial
damages. America Online, for example, apparendy attributes $0.00078 in equipment costs
to each incoming e-mail message by pro rating its overall investment in e-mail hardware,
enabling the company to quantify at least part of the costs it sustains when spammers send
millions of messages to AOL subscribers. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc.,
No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226, at *4, *9 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998); Am. On-
line, Inc. v. Christian Bros., No. 98 Civ. 8959 (DAB) (HBP), (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1999), at 17
(report and recommendation of magistrate judge), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/
dljunk/CHRIST-.pdf; Am. Online, Inc. v. CN Prods., Inc., No. 98-552-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 10,
1999) (order granting judgment and permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff), http://
legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/cnpmemo.html [hereinafter CN Order]; Am. On-
line, Inc. v. IMS, No. 98-0011-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998) (report and recommendation of
magistrate judge), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/imsreport.html. Also, since
end users can reduce their spam intake merely by changing providers and often blame
their own provider for the spam that they receive, ISPs have an additional incentive to take
on spammers. See generally Gartner Group, supra note 11, at 8.
Interestingly, while few of the United States spam-related cases have been brought by
individual recipients, there have been several cases brought by recipients of spain in Ger-
many, most of which have been successful. See, e.g., OLGZ 16, 320 (reporting an Oct. 13,
1998 decision of the Berlin Landgericht (Regional Court)), http://www.online-recht.de/
vorent.html?LGBerlin981013; OLGZ 16, 301 (reporting a May 14, 1998 decision of the
Berlin Landgericht), http://www.online-recht.de/vorent.html?LGBerlin980514; OLGZ 16,
201 (reporting an Apr. 2, 1998 decision of the Berlin Landgericht), http://www.online-
recht.de/vorent.html?LGBerlin980402; CLGZ 7, 748 (reporting a Feb. 11, 1998 decision of
the Brakel Amtsgericht (District Court, similar to a Magistrate)), http://www.online-
recht.de/vorent.html?AGBrakel980211; HKO 2, 3755 (reporting an Oct. 14, 1997 resolu-
tion of the Traunstein Landgericht), http://www.online-recht.de/vorent.html?LGTraun-
stein971014; cf CLGZ 110, 243 (reporting a Sept. 30, 1999 decision of the Kiel Amtsgericht
which dismissed plaintiffs case since the offending communication was not spam), http://
www.online-recht.de/vorent.html?AGKie1990930.
159. See infra Parts IV.A.1-4. In addition to the types of cases discussed in this Section,
there have been a number of cases involving claims related to the content of unsolicited e-
mail messages. See, e.g., Curtis v. DiMaio, 46 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discuss-
ing applicability of discrimination laws to racially or sexually offensive e-mail messages);
People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (applying consumer fraud and
false advertising laws to unsolicited commercial e-mail); Securities Exchange Comm'n, Liti-
gation Release No. 15959. SEC Fines Internet Stock Promoter Responsible for Massive Spam Cam-
paign, at http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr15959.txt (Oct. 27, 1998) (discussing SEC
v. Tribble, No. 98-8699 (RVX) (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 27, 1998), in which securities laws where
applied to spam containing investment recommendations without required disclosures);
see also Securities Exchange Comm'n, SEC Charges 44 Stock Promoters in First Internet Securities
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1. Destination Operators
Destination operators have sued spammers using a number of dif-
ferent legal theories. Most common are claims based upon the spam-
mer's unauthorized use of the destination operator's facilities, usually
characterized as trespass to chattels or conversion. Trespass to chattels
in particular has been alleged by destination operators in many spam
cases;160 conversion is less helpful since it requires a more substantial
Fraud Sweep: Purveyors of Fraudulent Spam, Online Newsletters, Message Board Postings, and Web-
sites Caught, at http://www.sec.gov/news/netfraud.htm (Oct. 28, 1998); sources cited supra
note 33 (discussing criminal prosecutions for sending racist threats by e-mail).
160. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Va.
1999); Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc., No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20226, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,
451-52 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va.
1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
16, 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-23 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Apr. 28, 1999); Am. Online, Inc. v. Blue Card Publ'g, No. 98-905-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2000),
at 6 (report and recommendation by magistrate judge), http://legal.web.aol.com/deci-
sions/dljunk/bluecardreport.pdf [hereinafter Blue Card Report]; CN Order, supra note
158; Plaintiff's Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Bliss (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1998) (No. 98-1397-Civ-
Orl-19A), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/blisscomplaint.html [hereinafter
Bliss Complaint]; Plaintiff's Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Christian Bros. (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
18, 1998) (No. 98 Civ. 8959(DAB)(HBP)), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/
chistiancomp.html [hereinafter Christian Complaint]; Plaintiff s Complaint, Am. Online,
Inc. v. Dayton (E.D. Va. Dec. 1998) (No. 98-1815-A), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/
dljunk/daytoncomp.html [hereinafter Dayton Complaint]; Plaintiff's Complaint, Am. On-
line, Inc. v. Global Mktg. Solutions, Inc. (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1998), http://Iegal.web.aol.com/
decisions/dljunk/global.html [hereinafter Global Complaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint, Am.
Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc. (N.D. Iowa Dec. 1998), http://le-
gal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/national.html [hereinafter Nat'l Health Complaint];
Plaintiff's Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Persaud (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1998) (No. 98-CY-2284
7W (LAB)), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/persaudcomp.html [hereinafter
Persaud Complaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. USA Home Employment
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 1998) (No. CV 98-10225 DDP (MANx)), http://legal.web.aol.com/deci-
sions/dljunk/usacomp.html [hereinafter USA Home Complaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint,
Am. Online, Inc. v. Wrhel (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1998), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/
dljunk/wrhel.html [hereinafter Wrhel Complaint]; Earthlink Network Inc. v. Cyber Pro-
motions, Inc., No. BC 167502 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1998) (consentjudgment and entry
of judgment & stipulation), http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/earthl.html [hereinafter
Earthlink Judgment]; Plaintiff's Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Web Communications
(E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 1998) (No. 98-289-A), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/
webcommc.html [hereinafter Web Complaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v.
Squeaky Clean Mktg. (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 18,1997) (No. 152613), http://legal.web.aol.com/
decisions/dljunk/squeakyc.html [hereinafter Squeaky Complaint]; Plaintiff's Complaint,
Bigfoot Partners, L.P. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1997) (No. 97 CIV 7397),
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/bigfootc.html [hereinafter Bigfoot Com-
plaint]; Plaintiffs Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Over the Air Equip., Inc. (E.D. Va. Oct.
1997) (No. 97-1547-A), http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/oaecomp.html [here-
inafter OAE Complaint]; Carl S. Kaplan, Company Says Junk E-Mailer Stole Its Identity, N.Y.
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interference with property rights. 16'
Trespass to chattels is committed when a person uses or in-
termeddles with another's personal property without authorization.
62
The trespasser is liable to the rightful possessor of the property if the
property's value or condition is impaired, or if the possessor is de-
prived of its use for a substantial time. 163 Anyone, including a spam-
mer, who sends e-mail messages to subscribers of an ISP or other
destination operator necessarily makes use of the operator's SMTP
server. However, routine use of an SMTP server for legitimate message
traffic is implicitly authorized and rarely causes the damage necessary
for liability. The trespass to chattels theory, therefore, seems best
suited to cases in which the destination operator has previously com-
municated to the spammer that its use of the operator's facilities is
not authorized and the spammer subsequently ignores the operator's
demands, thereby causing damage to the operator's system.
164
Destination operators have attempted to capture other costs in-
flicted by spain with claims such as unjust enrichment and misappro-
priation. For example, America Online ("AOL") has argued that
spammers have misappropriated its infrastructure. 165 AOL collects ad-
vertising fees from marketers in exchange for placing their advertise-
ments in its subscribers' screens.' 66 Spammers are able to circumvent
this process while still taking advantage of AOL's infrastructure to de-
TIMES CYBER L.J., Nov. 19, 1999, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/11/cyber/
cyberlaw/19law.html (discussing suit filed by Visto Corp. against a spammer); SimpleNet,
SimpleNet Awarded Judgment in "Spam" Lawsuit, at http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/docs/sim-
plel.html (Apr. 15, 1998) (discussing SimpleNet's suit against VNZ Info. & Entm't Servs.)
[hereinafter SimpleNet Article].
161. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965).
163. See id. § 218; see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 451-52; Am.
Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 550; CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962
F. Supp. at 1021; Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996);
Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 28 (2000).
164. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1019, 1024
(discussing defendant's actual notice of Compuserve's objection to spamming and the de-
fendant's continued trespass).
165. See Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Va. 1999);
Blue Card Report, supra note 160, at 5; Bliss Complaint, supra note 160; Christian Com-
plaint, supra note 160; Dayton Complaint, supra note 160; Global Complaint, supra note
160; Nat'l Health Complaint, supra note 160; Persaud Complaint, supra note 160; USA
Home Complaint, supra note 160; Wrhel Complaint, supra note 160; Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint, Am. Online, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (E.D. Va. June 17, 1996)
(No. 96-462) http://www.bna.com/e-law/docs/aolcyber.html [hereinafter Cyber Promo-
tions Complaint].
166. See sources cited supra note 165.
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liver their messages.1 67 Other ISPs have raised similar claims of unjust
enrichment based upon spammers' misappropriation of their com-
puting resources. 168
Unauthorized use of a destination operator's SMTP server and
other facilities can subject a spammer to liability under state and fed-
eral computer crime laws. 169 For example, the Federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act' 70 prohibits individuals from obtaining informa-
tion or causing damage by intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization, 171 providing for both criminal penalties 7 2 and a civil
right of action for injured parties. 173 Many spam-related cases have
involved requests for damages or injunctive relief based upon viola-
tions of state and federal computer crime laws. 174
Spammers frequently use the destination operator's domain
name or other service marks in message headers for various reasons,
including attempts to disguise the actual origin of the spam, to evade
filtering and blocking by the destination operator or its subscribers,
and to cause complaints to be directed to the destination operator
rather than to the spammer or its service providers. Destination opera-
167. See sources cited supra note 165.
168. See, e.g., Earthlink Judgment, supra note 160; Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160;
Plaintiff's Complaint, Concentric Network Corp. v. Wallace (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 1996) (No.
C-96 20829-RMW (EAI)), http://www.bna.com/e-law/docs/concentr.html [hereinafter
Concentric Complaint].
169. "Harvesting" of e-mail addresses from a destination operator's web site, chat sys-
tem, or other facilities may also give rise to liability under computer crime laws. See, e.g.,
Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (E.D. Va. 1998).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
171. See id. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(C) (Supp. 1999).
172. See id. § 1030(c) (Supp. 1999).
173. See id. § 1030(g) (Supp. 1999).
174. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Va.
1999); Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc., No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20226 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51;
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$
Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,1998); Blue Card Report,
supra note 160; CN Order, supra note 158; Bliss Complaint, supra note 160; Christian Com-
plaint, supra note 160; Dayton Complaint, supra note 160; Global Complaint, supra note
160; Nat'l Health Complaint, supra note 160; Persaud Complaint, supra note 160; USA
Home Complaint, supra note 160; Wrhel Complaint, supra note 160; Earthlink Judgment,
supra note 160; Web Complaint, supra note 160; Squeaky Complaint, supra note 160;
Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160; OAE Complaint, supra note 160; Concentric Com-
plaint, supra note 168; Cyber Promotions Complaint, supra note 165; SimpleNet Article,
supra note 160. A few of these cases (for example, Bigfoot Partners, L.P. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., Concentric Network Cop. v. Wallace, America Online, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.) have also
alleged violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711
(1994 & Supp. 1999). See Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160; Concentric Complaint, supra
note 168; Cyber Promotions Complaint, supra note 165.
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tors and other providers whose names are included in forged message
headers frequently pursue various trademark and unfair competition
claims against spammers. 175
The theories discussed here represent those most frequently ap-
plied in cases brought against spammers by destination operators.
Among other theories that have been raised in such cases are nui-
sance;1 76 misappropriation of name or identity; 177 fraud, misrepresen-
tation, or deceptive practices;178  negligence;1 79  and tortious
interference with contractual relations.180
2. Relay Operators
Most spam-related litigation has been brought by large consumer-
oriented ISPs which have been inundated with spam addressed to
their subscribers. In a few spam cases, however, the plaintiffs have
been operators of SMTP servers used by spammers to relay their
messages elsewhere. 81 While relay operators can configure their serv-
ers to prevent recurrences of the problem, often the damage has al-
ready been done in terms of system outages, reputational injury, and
the staff time needed to repair the damage and address complaints.1 82
175. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Sys. Inc., No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20226, at *8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.
2d at 449-50; Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 551-52; Hotmail Corp. v. Van$
Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); Blue Card Report,
supra note 160; CN Order, supra note 158; Christian Complaint, supra note 160; Dayton
Complaint, supra note 160; Global Complaint, supra note 160; Nat'l Health Complaint,
supra note 160; Persaud Complaint, supra note 160; USA Home Complaint, supra note 160;
Wrhel Complaint, supra note 160; Earthlink Judgment, supra note 160; Web Complaint,
supra note 160; Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160; OAE Complaint, supra note 160; Con-
centric Complaint, supra note 168; Cyber Promotions Complaint, supra note 165; Kaplan,
supra note 160; SimpleNet Article, supra note 160.
176. See, e.g., Christian Complaint, supra note 160.
177. See, e.g., id.; Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160.
178. See, e.g., Christian Complaint, supra note 160; Dayton Complaint, supra note 160;
Bigfoot Complaint, supra note 160; Concentric Complaint, supra note 168; Cyber Promo-
tions Complaint, supra note 165.
179. See, e.g., Dayton Complaint, supra note 160.
180. See, e.g., Concentric Complaint, supra note 168.
181. See infra note 183.
182. To at least some extent, the existence of open relays contributes to the sparn prob-
lem by making it easier for spammers to cover their trail. See discussion supra note 58 and
accompanying text. It is conceivable that destination operators and recipients of spam
might someday seek to hold relay operators themselves liable for spam, particularly in in-
stances where the identity of the spammer cannot be ascertained (or the spammer isjudg-
ment-proof) and the relay operator has refused previous requests to limit relaying. Cf
Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Online Raids Pose Issue of Firms' Security, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 6, 2000, at
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Relay operators have sued spammers using many of the same le-
gal theories as destination operators. 18 3 Trespass and computer abuse
are somewhat easier to prove in the case of third-party relaying be-
cause it is difficult to argue that relay operators implicitly consent to
the use of their servers for routing messages that neither originate
from nor are addressed to their own users. However, relaying through
servers in foreign countries is increasingly common, partly because
such servers are less likely to use current software that limits relay-
ing184 and partly because operators of such servers may be less likely
to take action against United States-based spammers. Most relay vic-
tims-unlike large ISPs whose customers are targeted by spammers-
are likely to find the expense of litigation prohibitive, particularly
given the likelihood that a spammer will be elusive or judgment-
proof.185 Furthermore, the mere threat of litigation may be sufficient
to send a spammer on its way to a different open relay, providing relay
victims little incentive to incur the cost of protracted litigation.
Al, Al, A13 (discussing potential liability of sites hijacked by hackers for use in attacking
other sites).
183. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint, Typhoon, Inc. v. Kentech Enters. (C.D. Cal. Aug.
20, 1997) (No. CV 97-6270JSL (AIJx)) (alleging violations of Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, false designation of origin and false description under the Lanham Act, misap-
propriation of computer services, misappropriation of name and identity, trespass to chat-
tels, libel, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition), http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/
typhoonl.html [hereinafter Typhoon Complaint], partial settlement entered, No. CV 97-6270
JSL (AIJx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1997) (consent judgment and permanent injunction),
http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/typhoon2.html; Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint,
Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Smith (E.D. Wis. Apr. 14, 1997) (No. 97-C-0371) (alleging
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, violations of Computer Fraud &
Abuse Act, violations of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, computer crimes under state
law, violations of state facsimile law, fraudulent representations, common-law trademark
infringement and unfair competition, and trespass to chattels), http://www.jmls.edu/
cyber/cases/strong/compl.html.
184. See CAUCE India, Spain in India, at http://www.india.cauce.org/spamindia.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2000); James Niccolai, China Seen as a Growing Source of Spain,
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 4, 2000, http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/
0,1151,13700,00.html; CAUCE India, Spare in India, at http://www.india.cauce.org/
spamindia.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Porn Spam Sent in Name of School Riles 147,000
Users, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Aug. 1, 1999, 1999 WL 17756027.
185. Although it is unlikely prosecutors would be interested in most instances of unau-
thorized third-party relaying, criminal charges might be appropriate in the most extreme
cases. Cf John Borland, ISP Seeks Criminal Charges against Spammer, TECHWEB NEWS, Nov. 13,
1997 (referring to criminal prosecution sought by destination operator), at http://
www.techweb.com/se/directlink.cgi?WIR1997111311.
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3. Forgery Victims
Forgery of message headers can help shield a spammer from be-
ing inundated with bounced messages and complaints, but often the
result is merely to shift these effects to an innocent third party whose
e-mail address or domain name is borrowed by the spammer. 18 6 In at
least one sense forgery can be more insidious than third-party relaying
and other spam-related activities because there is little a forgery victim
can do to prevent others from appropriating its identity.
Owners of domain names used in forged message headers have
brought several lawsuits.187 Among the claims that have been raised in
these cases are trademark infringement,18 8 unfair competition, 18 9 tres-
pass to chattels, 190 computer abuse, 19 misappropriation of name and
identity,192 violation of publicity rights, 193 false light invasion of pri-
186. It is possible to use an invalid or fictitious domain name, of course, or to omit a
domain name entirely. However, some e-mail filters automatically check for valid domain
names in headers (this is significantly easier than checking for valid e-mail addresses), and
some people who actually read spam may pay more attention to a message that appears to
originate from a valid address, so spammers tend to avoid using addresses that are obvi-
ously invalid.
Some spammers reportedly target forgery victims as an intentional reputation attack,
but in most instances the use of a particular person's name or e-mail address is likely mere
coincidence. See, e.g., Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297-98 (D.
Colo. 1998) (describing spammer's use of "nobody@localhost.com," apparently in the mis-
taken belief that it was an invalid address).
187. See, e.g., Classified Ventures, L.L.C. v. Softcell Mktg., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 898
(N.D. 111. 2000); Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (D. Colo.
1998); Plaintiff's Complaint, Juno Online Servs., L.P. v. Scott Allen Export Sales (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 1997) (No. 97 Civ. 8694), http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/juno/comp.html
[hereinafter Juno Complaint]; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 183; Parker v. C.N. Enters.,
No. 97-06273 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997) (order of final judgment), http://le-
gal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/parkero.html; Plaintiffs' Application for Injunctive Re-
lief, Web Sys. Corp. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1997) (No. 97-30156), http:/
/wwwjmls.edu/cyber/cases/websysl.html [hereinafter Web Sys. Application]; Randy Bar-
rett, RustNet Nabs Spammers, INTER@cTIvE WK., Sept. 5, 1997 (discussing RustNet's suit
against spammers), at http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/970905h.html; Janet Korn-
blum, Web Firm Takes on Cyber Promotions, CNET NEWS.cOM, June 6, 1997, at http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-319513.htm; Microsoft, Q&A: Fighting Spam at MSN
Hotmail, at h ttp: //www.microsoft.com/PressPass/features /1999/09-22spam.asp (Sept. 22,
1999) (discussing Microsoft Corp. v. Franpro, Inc., No. 99-079269R (BQRx) (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 1999)) [hereinafter Hotmail Article].
188. See, e.g., Classified Ventures, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 900; Hotmail Article, supra note 187.
189. See, e.g., Classified Ventures, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 901;Juno Complaint, supra note 187;
Typhoon Complaint, supra note 183.
190. See, e.g., Seid, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1298; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 183; Web
Sys. Application, supra note 187; Hotmail Article, supra note 187.
191. See, e.g., Hotmail Article, supra note 187.
192. See, e.g., Juno Complaint, supra note 187; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 183.
193. See, e.g., Seidl, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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vacy, 194 unjust enrichment, 19 5 fraud,196 misrepresentation, 197 decep-
tive practices, 198 and negligence. 199 Like third-party relay cases,
header forgery cases generally involve relatively straightforward legal
claims, but practical obstacles often prevent forgery victims from ob-
taining relief.200
4. Service Providers
The cases discussed thus far have involved claims based primarily
upon tort law brought against spammers with whom the plaintiffs had
no prior relationship. There have also been several disputes between
spammers and their own service providers, within the United States 201
and elsewhere, 20 2 mainly involving contract claims.20 3 In such cases,
194. See, e.g., id.
195. See, e.g., Juno Complaint, supra note 187; Typhoon Complaint, supra note 183.
196. See, e.g., Juno Complaint, supra note 187.
197. See, e.g., id.
198. See, e.g., Classified Ventures, L.L.C. v. Softcell Mktg., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901
(N.D. Ill. 2000); Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (D. Colo.
1998).
199. See, e.g., Seidl, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1298; Web Sys. Application, supra note 187.
200. Cf supra text accompanying note 185. One United Kingdom-based ISP that was
victimized by header forgery filed suit against the spammer in a United States court, and as
a condition of settlement required the spammer to agree to limitations on its future spain-
related activities, even those not involving the plaintiff ISP. This is reportedly the first case
involving such a broad remedy. SeeJean Eaglesham, Internet Company Wins US Legal Fight on
Junk E-Mails, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 29, 2000, at 9;Jason Gonzalez, RulingBars Spammer
From Repeat Mailings, IMARKETING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2000, at http://www.dmnews.com/
archive/2000-04-24/7916.html.
201. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Info. Servs., Inc., No. 97-5931,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15344 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997); Cyber Promotions Sues WorldCom, at
http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/cp-wcO.html (June 24, 1997) (discussing a spammer's
suit against his ISP) [hereinafter WorldCom Article]; Kaplan, supra note 160 (discussing
Visto's suit against a Visto user who spammed); Hotmail Article, supra note 187 (discussing
Microsoft's suit against a Hotmail user who spammed).
A similar situation arose in another case, Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., No. 98-C1V-
5489 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 1998), which involved an ISP that terminated service to a
subscriber based upon a mistaken belief that he was responsible for spamming. See Hall
Complaint, supra note 50; Metal Tiger Technologies, Cyber Rights Litigation, at http://
metal-tiger.com/delinquent/litigation.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
202. See, e.g., 1267623 Ont. Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C-20546/99, 1999 Ont. Sup.
C.J. LEXIS 465 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. June 14, 1999); I.D. Internet Direct Ltd. v. Altelaar, No.
99-CV-162738, 1999 Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 320 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. May 3, 1999).
Virgin Net brought the first spam lawsuit in the United Kingdom in April of 1999
against a spammer, Adrian Paris, who settled a few weeks later. See Tim Richardson, Virgin
Spammer Settles out of Court, REa. (London), May 26, 1999, http://www.theregister.co.uk/
content/archive/4563.html; Jane Wakefield, Virgin Sues Spain Pest, ZDNET UK, Apr. 20,
1999, at http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/ 1999/1 5/ns-7833.html; John Willcock, Virgin Takes
Action to Stop "Spamming" on the Internet, INDEP. (London), Apr. 19, 1999, LEXIS, News Li-
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the provider typically is permitted to terminate the spammer's service
and the spammer may be enjoined from opening additional accounts
with the provider,20 4 although actual or even liquidated damages to
the ISP should also be available in appropriate cases. 20 5
Internet service providers normally require their customers to
abide by terms of service that clearly prohibit most or all forms of
spam,20 6 but even a general reference to "netiquette" rules may suffice
to support a provider's termination of a customer.20 7 Because the
brary, Independent File; Virgin Net Sues Customer, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 20, 1999, at http://
www.wired.com/news/news/technology/0,1282,19224,00.html.
203. In another recent case, a domain name registrar sued a marketer for collecting
domain registrants' names and contact information from the registrar's online database
and using the information for solicitations, including spam. See Brief of Amicus Curiae
ICANN, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2000) (No. 00-Civ-5747 (BSJ)),
http://www.icann.org/registrars/register.com-verio-amicus-22sep00.hun; Joanna Glasner,
Setting Limits for "Whois"Data, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 4, 2000, at http://www.wired.com/news/
politics/0,1283,38025,00.html; REGISTER COM: Lawsuit Alleges Verio Sent Unsolicited E-Mails,
Calls, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2000, 2000 WL-WSJ 3039047.
204. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 201-202.
205. Provisions for liquidated damages for spain-related violations are becoming com-
mon in ISP service agreements. See, e.g., Adam Pty Ltd, Terms and Conditions, at http://
www.adam.com.au/serviceterms.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2000) (Austl. $5 per message or
$0.39 per megabyte); Elecs. 2000, Terms of Service (TOS) for All POP3 Electronics 2000 Users, at
http://electronics2000.com/pop3/ (last modifiedJan. 1, 2000) ($100 per message); Inter-
Access, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 24 ($20,000); Juno, Guidelines, supra note 23 ($200
per day); MSN Hotmail, MSNHotmail Terms of Service, at http://www.hotmail.msn.com/cgi-
bin/dasp/hminfoshell.asp?content=tos&_lang=EN&id=2&ct=980651510 (last visited Aug.
8, 2000) ($5 per message); NUNet, Inc., NUNet's Terms of Service Agreement, at http://
www.nni.com/tos.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) ($125 per hour for staff time, plus $0.50
per addressee); Salaam, Salaam's Ummah.org Terms of Service (TOS), at http://con-
fig.ummah.org/signup.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (15 per message); StarHub Pte Ltd,
Terms & Conditions for StarHub Internet Services, at http://regwww.mystarhub.com.sg/help/
terms.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (Sing. $10 per message); cf infra note 266 and accom-
panying text (discussing statutory damage provisions).
206. See Nora Macaluso, Major ISPs Boot Spammers, E-CoMMERCE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/001110-1.shtml. A 1997 case in-
volved a provider whose contract with a customer included a term explicitly permitting the
customer to send unsolicited bulk e-mail. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Info.
Servs., Inc., No. 97-5931, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15344, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1997).
When the provider found itself subjected to numerous denial-of-service, or "ping," attacks
because of its unpopular customer, it terminated the customer's service notwithstanding
the contract. See id. at *2. The court noted that the provider could have anticipated the
attacks and was obligated to give thirty days' advance notice before terminating service, as
required by the explicit terms of the parties' contract. See id. at *6, *10; see also WorldCom
Article, supra note 201 (alleging similar facts in lawsuit filed by same customer against
another service provider).
207. See 1267623 Ont. Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C-20546/99, 1999 Ont. Sup. C.J.
LEXIS 465, at *7-*15 (Ont. Super. Ct. J.June 14, 1999); see also Wakefield, supra note 202
(quoting Virgin Net terms that prohibited subscribers from "send[ing] material likely to
cause annoyance, inconvenience or anxiety").
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backlash against spain is likely to affect all providers that are associ-
ated with a spammer, many providers prohibit their customers from
spamming even if the provider's own facilities are not used to send the
messages. 208
Lawsuits may be relatively effective for large plaintiffs like
America Online in combating relatively large, highly visible, and per-
sistent spammers like the now-defunct "spam king," Cyber Promo-
tions. But spammers are often much smaller operators-individuals
who may use a succession of dial-up accounts with several different
providers to advertise web sites or multi-level scams in exchange for
commissions.20 9 These spammers can be very difficult to trace-fre-
quently they route their messages through mail servers in foreign
countries-and most spammers do not have sufficient assets to justify
a lawsuit, even if the havoc they wreak is substantial and measurable.
While most of the spain cases involve traditional litigation, the
service provider cases may be prime candidates for alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution ("ADR"). For example, Internet service prov-
iders might well begin including mandatory arbitration clauses in
their service agreements, and parties with legitimate disputes might
voluntarily submit to mediation or arbitration in order to avoid the
costs of litigation. Unfortunately, the only widely reported application
of ADR to the spam problem thus far has been acknowledged as a
failure.210
208. See, e.g., 1267623 Ont. Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C-20546/99, 1999 Ont. Sup.
C.J. LEXIS 465, at *16-*17 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. June 14, 1999); Access Nevada Internet
Servs., Access Nevada's Anti-Span Policy, at http://www.anv.net/antispam.shtml (last visited
Aug. 8, 2000); @Home, @Home Service Acceptable Use Policy, at http://www.home.com/sup-
port/aup/ (last modified May 8, 2000); Erols Internet Servs., Erols Internet Access Agreement,
at http://www.erols.com/erols/index/agreement.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); InterAc-
cess, Acceptable Use Policy, supra note 24; Juno, Guidelines, supra note 23; ReplyNet LLC,
ReplyNets Terms of Service Agreement, at http://www.reply.net/terms.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2001); Response-O-Matic, Terms of Use, at http://www.response-o-matic.com/legal.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2000).
209. See SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 2, at 36-38.
210. The Virtual Magistrate Project was an experimental service initiated in 1996 by the
Cyberspace Law Institute and operated by Villanova University School of Law. See Virtual
Magistrate Project, Virtual Magistrate Established for the Internet, at http://www.vmag.org/
docs/press/030496.html (Mar. 4, 1996). The project is now operated by Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law but appears to be virtually defunct. See The Virtual Magistrate, at http://
www.vmag.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analy-
sis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163, 1198 & n.91 (1999); Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met,
3 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 176-77 (2000). The Virtual Magistrate's first case (and apparently its
only one) was a complaint brought against America Online by one of its subscribers, seek-
ing to force AOL to block or remove a posting by a third party, Email America. AOL
agreed to submit the matter to arbitration, but Email America did not-and not surpris-
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B. Legislation
The expense of lawsuits, along with the uncertain status of the
law regarding spare, has led to calls for legislation specifically de-
signed to restrict or prohibit spain. Bills have been introduced in Con-
gress 211 and in state legislatures, and more than a dozen states fhave
already enacted anti-spain legislation of one form or another.21 2 The
ingly, the Virtual Magistrate held that AOL should remove the offending posting from its
system. See Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott III, Note, Shaping New Legal Fron-
tiers: Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 711, 727-33 (1998);
Virtual Magistrate Project, Virtual Magistrate Issues Its First Decision Recommends that AOL Re-
move a Subscriber Message Offering Millions of Email Addresses For Sale, at http://
www.vmag.org/docs/press/052196.html (May 21, 1996). As it turned out, AOL could not
"remove" the posting, since it was merely an e-mail message that was delivered through
AOL's system. See Almaguer & Baggott, supra, at 732-33; Wendy R. Leibowitz, Internet
Mediators: "We're Idle, " NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A7. Critical commentary on the project
has generally been unfavorable, primarily due to its handling of the Tierney matter. See, e.g.,
Almaguer & Baggott, supra, at 730-36; Leibowitz, supra, at A7; David J. Loundy, Virtual
Magistrate Becomes a Reality, Sort of CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 16, 1996, http://
www.loundy.com/CDLB/Virtual-Magistrate.html; Mark Voorhees, A "Good" Case, Not an
"Ideal" Case: Virtual Justice: The No-Show Case Showcases Promise and Peril of Magistrate Project,
INFO. L. ALERT,June 3,1996,1996 WL 8913605. See generally Ethan Katsh &Janet Rifkin, An
Online Ombuds Office on the Internet: Interim Report to the National Center for Automated Informa-
tion Research, at http://www.ombuds.org/ncair3.html (Aug. 26, 1996) (expressing doubt
whether online mediation is well-suited to resolving spain-related disputes).
211. See Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 2001, H.R. 95, 107th Cong.; Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2000, S. 2542, 106th Cong.;
Netizens Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 3024, 106th Cong.; Unsolicited Commercial Elec-
tronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong.; Can Spam Act, H.R. 2162, 106th Cong.
(1999); E-Mail User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. (1999); Internet Freedom Act,
H.R. 1686, 106th Cong. § 104 (1999); Internet Growth and Development Act of 1999, H.R.
1685, 106th Cong. § 201; Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong.; Unsolicited Com-
mercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, S. 771, 105th Cong.; Netizens Protection Act of
1997, H.R. 1748, 105th Cong.
212. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, .45 (Deering Supp. 2000) (California);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/1, 511/5, 511/10, 511/15 (West Supp. 2000) (Illinois);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714E.1, .2 (West Supp. 2000) (Iowa); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.6
(West Supp. 2000) (Louisiana); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 41.705-735 (Michie Supp. 1999)
(Nevada); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453, -458, 1-539.2A (1999) (North Carolina); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 6-47-2, 11-52-1, -4.1, -6 (Supp. 1999) (Rhode Island); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-
2501, -2502 (Supp. 1999) (Tennessee); Virginia Computer Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-152.1-.15 (Michie 1996 & Michie Supp. 2000) (Virginia); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.190.010-.050 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2001) (Washington); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 46A-6G-] to -5 (Michie 1999) (West Virginia); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, 2000
Colo. Sess. Laws 2031 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2.5-101 to -105, 13-6-105, -
403) (Colorado); Act of June 23, 1999, No. 99-160, 1999 Conn. Pub. Acts 446 (Connecti-
cut); Act ofJuly 2, 1999, ch. 135, 72 Del. Laws 7 (1999) (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11,
§§ 931(12)-(17), 937, 938) (Delaware); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423, 2000 Idaho Sess.
Laws 1373 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-603E) (Idaho); Act of June 27, 2000, ch.
763, § A, 2000 Mo. Laws 735, 749 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 407.1300-.1340)
(Missouri); Act of June 8, 1999, ch. 337, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515 (to be codified at
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United States Senate passed a spam bill in May of 1998,213 and the
House of Representatives passed a bill with stronger anti-spam provi-
sions in 2000,214 neither of which were enacted into law. Other coun-
tries and the European Union have also considered imposing
statutory restrictions on spam.21 5 The legislative responses to spam
thus far have ranged in substance from mere disclosure require-
ments21 6 all the way to outright prohibition of unsolicited bulk or
commercial e-mail messages. 217
1. Prohibition
In the United States, Delaware has enacted what appears to be
the most restrictive spam law.2 18 Sending unsolicited bulk commercial
e-mail constitutes a violation of Delaware's computer crime law.
2 19
The law applies to messages sent into Delaware from outside the state
if the sender knew that there was a "reasonable possibility" that the
recipient was in Delaware. 220
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.1-.4) (Oklahoma); Act of June 13, 2000, No. 25, §1, 2000 Pa.
Legis. Serv. 91 (to be codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5903(a.1), (1), (m)) (Pennsylvania).
213. See Anti-Slamming Amendments Act, S. 1618, 105th Cong. (1998).
214. See Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong.
This bill was recently reintroduced to the 107th Congress. See Unsolicited Electronic Mail
Act of 2001, H.R. 95, 107th Cong.
215. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes.
216. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 41.730 (Michie Supp. 1999).
217. See Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7 (1999) (to be codified at DEL.
CODE tit. 11, §§ 931(12)-(17), 937, 938).
218. See id.
219. See id. (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 937(a)) (providing that a crime is
committed when one "without authorization, intentionally or recklessly distributes any un-
solicited bulk commercial electronic mail (commercial E-mail) to any receiving address or
account under the control of any authorized user of a computer system"). "Bulk" is not
defined in the statute, although messages "sent between human beings" are exempted. See
id. Similarly, "unsolicited" is not defined, but the statute exempts messages that are sent at
the recipient's request, by an organization to its members, or with a pre-existing business
relationship. See id.
220. The statute provides:
For the purposes of this section, conduct occurring outside of the State shall be
sufficient to constitute this offense if such conduct is within the terms of Section
204 of this title, or if the receiving address or account was under the control of
any authorized user of a computer system who was located in Delaware at the
time he or she received the electronic mail or communication and the defendant
was aware of circumstances which rendered the presence of such authorized user
in Delaware a reasonable possibility.
Id. (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 937(d)).
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The Netizens Protection Act of 1997,221 one of the first two spam-
related bills introduced in the United States Congress, 22 2 would have
broadened the federal law that prohibits unsolicited facsimile adver-
tisements to include advertisements transmitted by electronic mail.2 23
None of the recent federal bills include an outright prohibition of
spam.
2 2 4
The European Union does not prohibit unsolicited commercial
e-mail, but permits individual member states to do so.2 25 Finland,226
Germany,227 and Italy2 2 8 all have laws prohibiting UCE, while Austria
prohibits both UCE and UBE, 229 and other European countries are
221. H.R. 1748, 105th Cong. (1997).
222. The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, S. 771, 105th
Cong., was introduced one day earlier.
223. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of current
fax advertising law to e-mail).
224. The Netizens Protection Act was reintroduced in 1999, but the later version
merely included disclosure and opt-out requirements. See H.R. 3024, 106th Cong. (1999).
Legislation introduced in early 1999 would have authorized the FTC to enact regulations
governing unsolicited commercial e-mail as a deceptive act or practice, although it seems
unlikely that the FTC would have used this authority to prohibit UCE entirely. See Protec-
tion Against Scams on Seniors Act of 1999, H.R. 612, 106th Cong. § 202; Telemarketing
Fraud and Seniors Protection Act, S. 699, 106th Cong. § 202(a) (1999) (companion bill to
H.R. 612).
225. See Common Position Adopted by the Council with a View to the Adoption of a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Legal Aspects of In-
formation Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market,
2000 O.J. (C 128) 32, 36, 40-42, 47, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/
media/eleccomm/composen.pdf [hereinafter Directive on Electronic Commerce]. Prior
EU directives require marketers to comply with "opt-out" requests. See Directive 97/66/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sec-
tor, art. 12, 1998 O.J. (L 024) 1, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en_
397L0066.html; Directive 97/7/EC on the European Parliament and of the Council of 20
May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, art. 10, 1997
O.J. (L 144) 19, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en_397LOO07.html [here-
inafter Directive 97/7/EC]; Directive 95/46/EC on the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 14(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31,
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395LOO46.html.
226. See EuroCAUCE, Finland, at http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/cfi.html
(last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (citing 1999 amendment to Data Security Act).
227. See EuroCAUCE, Germany, at http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/c_
de.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (citing Unfair Competition Law and trespass provisions
in Federal Civil Code); see also cases cited supra note 158.
228. See EuroCAUCE, Italy, at http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/cit.html (last
visited Aug. 8, 2000) (citing Legislative Degree of May 22, 1999).
229. See §§ 101, 104(3) (23) TKG BGBI 188/1999, http://www.tkc.at/www/RechtsDB.
nsf/d2bebf4c9dc898ccl2567e8002cl cb2/5376142e8598c2de412567e8004d944f! Open
Document (last visited Jan. 16, 2001) (displaying the relevant sections of the Austrian tele-
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considering whether to enact similar restrictions. 230 Neither Australia
nor Canada, two other countries generally regarded as having much
stronger privacy laws than the United States, have laws that prohibit
spam.231
communications law ("Telekommunikationsgesetz"), pertaining to unsolicited e-mail);
EuroCAUCE, Austria, at http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/c-at.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2000).
230. The United Kingdom is in the process of implementing Directive 97/7/EC, supra
note 225, and is currently considering an opt-in regulation that would prohibit most UCE
sent to United Kingdom residents from within the United Kingdom and possibly else-
where. See U.K. Dep't of Trade & Indus., Implementation of EU Directive 97/7/EC on the Protec-
tion of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts: A Further Consultation Paper: Annex A, at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/CACP/ca/policy/distanceselling/annexa.htm (Nov. 1999); U.K
Office of Fair Trading, Problems with Online Shopping?, at http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/shop-
ping/noframes/watchout.html (last modified Apr. 5, 2000). But see Colin Lloyd, Dear US.
Direct Marketer: Colin Lloyd on the Vicissitudes of Privacy and E-Mail, DM NEWS, Apr. 17, 2000,
LEXIS, News Library, DMNews File (citing rumors that the United Kingdom will favor an
opt-out regime for unsolicited e-mail). See generally EuroCAUCE, United Kingdom, at http://
www.euro.cauce.org/en/countries/c.uk.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (noting argu-
ments against UCE under existing United Kingdom laws).
In 1999, the French Data Processing and Liberties Commission published a report on
unsolicited e-mail, but the report focused primarily on the propriety of various methods of
collecting e-mail addresses rather than the practice of sending unsolicited bulk or commer-
cial messages. See Comm'n Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libert~s, Prospection Non Sol-
licitge sur Internet et "Spamming" la Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertis Rappelle
la Regle du jeu [Unsolicited Advertising on the Internet and "Spamming": the National Commission
of Data Processing and Freedoms Points Out the Rule of the Game], at http://www.cnil.fr/actu/
communic/ (Oct. 28, 1999) [hereinafter CNIL, Spamming).
The Danish Consumer Ombudsman was unable to reach an agreement on the issue
with industry representatives in 1998, while a 1999 position paper issued by the consumer
ombudsmen of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden states that prior consent is needed
for e-mail solicitations. See EuroCAUCE, Denmark, at http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/coun-
tries/cdk.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2000); Nat'l Consumer Agency, The Nordic Consumer
Ombudsmen Want to Secure Proper Trading and Marketing on the Internet, at http://www.fs.dk/
uk/misc/p990106u.htm Uan. 6, 1999); Nat'l Consumer Agency, The Nordic Consumer
Ombudsmen's Position Paper to Trading and Marketing on the Internet and in Similar Communica-
tion Systems, at http://www.consumer.dk/uk/acts/nord_gui.htm (Dec. 30, 1998); Nat'l
Consumer Agency, News from the Danish Consumer Ombudsman: Collapse of Internet Negotia-
tions, at http://www.fs.dk/uk/misc/p980928u.htm (Sept. 30, 1998).
231. Australia's Department of the Treasury recently published a draft report on best
practices for electronic commerce, including three proposed alternative provisions on un-
solicited e-mail, one of which ("Opt In") would effectively constitute a prohibition on
spam. See Austl. Dep't of Treasury, Building Consumer Sovereignty in Electronic Commerce: A Best
Practice Model for Business, at 5, http://www.ecommerce.treasury.gov.au/publications/
BuildingConsumerSovereigntyInElectronicCommerce-ABestPracticeModelForBusiness/
ecommerce.pdf (Dec. 1999). The Australian Internet Industry Association has endorsed an
opt-in regime. See Internet Indus. Ass'n, Opt-Out Spain Is Out of Bounds, at http://
www.iia.net.au/news/00021 I.html (Feb. 20, 2000).
Canada's new privacy law imposes substantial restrictions on the use and collection of
personal information, but does not include any provisions specific to unsolicited e-mail. See
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2. Enforcement of Anti-Spam Policies
ISPs and other destination operators generally have policies that
govern the use of their facilities for various purposes, and nearly all of
them prohibit spamming in particular. Several jurisdictions have con-
sidered enforcing such policies as a more flexible, and perhaps more
palatable, alternative to enacting an outright ban on spam. Giving le-
gal force to providers' policies is consistent with the trespass perspec-
tive: if placing an SMTP server on the Internet implicitly authorizes
others to use the server to deliver e-mail messages to users who are
affiliated with the server, then announcing conditions on the use of
the server withdraws that implicit authority when the conditions are
not satisfied. 232 The difficult questions in such an approach lie in de-
termining the circumstances under which policies should be en-
forced-in particular, determining what form of notice ought to be
required before a provider's policies can be enforced with respect to a
particular spammer.
Several methods of providing constructive notice of such policies
have been proposed. First, a provider may choose to post its policies
on the web-preferably, where they can be easily located by someone
who knows nothing more than the prospective recipient's e-mail ad-
dress. 233 Second, a provider may configure its SMTP server to transmit
a brief reference to its policies during every session, before it will re-
ceive a message. 234 A third approach would be for providers to regis-
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Bill No. C-6 (2000)
(Can.), http://www.privcom.gc.ca/english/02_06_e.htm (enacted Apr. 13, 2000).
232. See supra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying notes (discussing trespass claims by desti-
nation operators).
233. Thus, for example, one planning to transmit an unsolicited message to
"user@example.com" could access the web page at http://www.example.com/ and look
for a reference to e-mail policies. Many destination operators currently post their policies
in this manner. See, e.g., Tom Geller, Suespammers.org, at http://www.suespammers.org/
(last visited Aug. 8, 2000) ("The suespammers.org Web and Mail servers are located in
California. You are hereby forbidden to send unsolicited commercial e-mail or unsolicited
bulk mail of any kind to a suespammers.org address. (California BPC, Section
17538.45)."); NetEase Internet Access Seroice, at http://www.netease.net/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2000) ("The netease.net Web and Mail servers are located in Tennessee. In accordance
with Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 47, Chapter 18 you are hereby forbidden to send
unsolicited commercial e-mail or unsolicited bulk mail of any kind to a netease.net ad-
dress. Anyone that send un-solicited e-mail to netease.net users will be fined to the maxi-
mum allowed amount of $10 per message or $5,000 per day."); WA-STATE-
RESIDENT: COM, at http://www.wa-state-resident.com/ (last modified Jan. 31, 2000) ("Un-
solicited bulk e-mail may not be sent to any address at WA-STATE-RESIDENT.COM with-
out the recipient's permission.").
234. See CAUCE, CAUCE's "SMTP Banner Notification" Proposa, at http://
www.cauce.org/proposal/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (suggesting that recipient sites could
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ter their policies with a central authority, such as a state or federal
government agency; spammers could be required to consult a central
registry of providers' policies before sending unsolicited messages. 235
Louisiana law prohibits sending unsolicited bulk e-mail if the
sender uses a provider's facilities to transmit the messages in violation
of the provider's policies;23 6 the law does not specify whether the
sender must have actual notice of the policies. 237 California will en-
force a destination operator's policies prohibiting unsolicited com-
mercial e-mail if the sender has actual notice thereof.238 Several other
states will enforce particular aspects of providers' policies, but not to
the extent of a complete prohibition on UCE or UBE.23 9
Some of the bills introduced in the last session of the United
States Congress would have also given force to providers' anti-spam
policies had they been enacted. The Internet Growth and Develop-
ment Act of 1999240 would have enforced policies that prohibit UCE if
the sender had actual notice of the policies. 241 The Netizens Protec-
include "NO UCE" or "UCE POLICY AT " in the "SMTP banner," or initial greeting
message transmitted at the beginning of every SMTP session).
235. For example, one bill introduced in the United States Congress would have pro-
hibited sending UCE to e-mail addresses containing a domain name whose owner had
previously notified the FTC of its election not to receive such messages. See Inbox Privacy
Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 2(b), (c). A similar approach was proposed in a 1998
New Hampshire bill. See H.R. 1633, 1998 Gen. Ct., 155th Sess. (N.H. 1998) (authorizing
registration of "restricted solicitation electronic mail provider[s]").
236. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.6(A) (West Supp. 2000).
237. See id. Since the Louisiana law imposes criminal sanctions for violating a provider's
policies, it seems likely that actual notice will be required.
238. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(f)(3) (A) (i) (Deering Supp. 2000). An
amendment to the California statute would have created an official state registry of provid-
ers with UCE policies; registration would serve as an alternative to actual notice. See Assem.
B. 2704, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). However, it was vetoed by the Governor.
See Cal. Legis. Servs., Current Bill Status, at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/
ab_2701-2750/ab_2704_bill_20000914_status.html (last modified Sept. 11, 2000).
239. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-52-1(15)(e)(2), -4.1(7) (Supp. 1999) (unlawful to
send UBE with forged headers in violation of a provider's policies); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
152.2, .4(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2000) (same); Act of June 23, 1999, No. 99-160,
§ I (a) (14) (B), (b)(7), 1999 Conn. Pub. Acts 446, 448-49 (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
458(a) (6) (1999) (unlawful to send UBCE with forged headers in violation of a provider's
policies); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6G-1 (1), -2 (Michie 1999) (unlawful to send UBE in
violation of a provider's policies if the message fails to identify the sender or has forged
headers, a false or misleading subject line, or sexually explicit content); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-18-2501, -2502 (Supp. 1999) (defining use "without authority" to include viola-
tions of an e-mail provider's policies, though statute places no restrictions on use "without
authority").
240. H.R. 1685, 106th Cong. (1999).
241. See id. § 201.
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tion Act of 1999242 would have enforced anti-spam policies but only
against a provider's own customers. 243 Three other bills would have
enforced anti-UCE policies based upon various forms of constructive
notice-web posting,244 SMTP banner notification, 245 or a centralized
registry.246
If a law is enacted that enforces providers' anti-spam policies and
one or more of these forms of constructive notice is deemed ade-
quate, the practical result will be roughly equivalent to imposing a
legal prohibition on spam, since nearly all destination operators al-
ready have anti-spam policies and nearly all likely will take advantage
of the constructive notice provision.
3. Opt-Out Procedures
Most of the responses to spam share as a common objective the
desire to give individuals the ability to control whether they receive
bulk or commercial e-mail messages. A prohibition on spam-or a law
giving destination operators the ability to ban spain from their sys-
tems-would accomplish this objective with an "opt-in" rule: market-
ers would be permitted to send e-mail only to persons who explicitly
opt in to receive it. In an opt-out system, on the other hand, senders
may communicate with everyone except those who have explicitly
opted out.
Several proposed statutes would implement various opt-out sys-
tems. For example, spammers might be required to include instruc-
tions for submitting opt-out requests, possibly even with a toll-free
phone number, and then would be subject to penalties for ignoring
opt-out requests. 247 Or, ISPs might be required to maintain opt-out
lists of their own users, or a state or federal agency might maintain an
opt-out list of e-mail addresses or entire domains that have opted out
of receiving spam. 248
242. H.R. 3024, 106th Cong. (1999).
243. See id. § 3.
244. See Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong.
§ 5(b)(2)(B)(i); Can Spam Act, H.R. 2162, 106th Cong., § 2(d) (4) (C) (i) (1999).
245. See Can Spam Act, H.R. 2162, 106th Cong. § 2(d) (4) (C) (ii), (iii) (1999).
246. See Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 2(b), (c).
247. See, e.g., Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 5(a);
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2000, S. 2542,
106th Cong. § 4(a); Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 2(d); Netizens Protec-
tion Act of 1999, H.R. 3024, 106th Cong. § 2(a).
248. See Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 1999, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 4(a) (origi-
nal version of the bill), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c106:./temp/
-c106PruMtl; see also Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 2(c); H.R. 1633,1998
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The European Union is currently considering a proposal that
would establish national opt-out registries, and companies would be
prohibited from sending spam to those listed in the registries. 249 Re-
sidents of the State of Washington can add their e-mail addresses to an
online registry of Washington residents, designed to provide spam-
mers with notice that they are protected by the state's spam statute,
although the legal effect of the registry is not entirely clear.250 Many
other states have enacted legislation requiring spammers to honor in-
dividual opt-out requests, 251 but none has yet adopted a centralized
opt-out registry for Internet users, or even domain-specific registries
to be maintained by destination operators.
4. Content Regulations
An alternative to regulating the conditions under which unsolic-
ited e-mail messages may be sent is to regulate the information con-
tained in such messages. Usually such restrictions are aimed at
message headers, 252 although laws that apply only to commercial
Gen. Ct., 155th Sess. (N.H. 1998). Domain-wide opt-out is equivalent to a destination oper-
ator's policy that prohibits spam. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
249. See CNIL, Spamming, supra note 230; Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra
note 225, at 33; see also sources cited supra note 225.
250. See Wash. Ass'n of Internet Service Providers, WAISP Registry Page, at http://regis-
try.waisp.org/ (last modified May 3, 1999). The Washington statute prohibits using false
headers and misleading subject lines in unsolicited commercial e-mail messages if the
sender knows, or has reason to know, that the recipient is a Washington resident. See WAsH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 19.190.020 (West Supp. 2001). The WAISP Registry presumably is in-
tended to satisfy the constructive knowledge requirement, although the statute seems to
recognize constructive knowledge only when confirmation of residency is available upon
request from the registrant of the domain name contained in the recipient's e-mail ad-
dress. See id. § 19.190.020(2); cf Attorney Gen. of Wash., Junk E-Mail: Protect Yourself ("As
long as the location of a Washington e-mail address is available to the would-be spammer,
whether or not they actually check all possible sources of this information, they are prohib-
ited from sending unsolicited e-mail in violation of the law to a Washington resident."),
http://www.wa.gov/ago/junkemail/protect.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
251. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(c) (Deering Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 714E.1 (2) (e) (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(c) (Supp. 1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(c) (Supp. 1999); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000
Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2033 (to be codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-2.5-103(5)); Act of Apr.
17, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1374 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE
§ 48-603E(3)(d)).
Legislation introduced at the federal level also would have required spammers to
honor opt-out requests. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Mar-
keting Act of 2000, S. 2542, 106th Cong. § 4(b); Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail
Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 5(a)(2); Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th
Cong. § 2(a) (1); Netizens Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 3024, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (2); E-Mail
User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1999).
252. See supra note 18 (discussing message headers).
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messages-particularly those that prohibit the use of misleading sub-
ject lines-can affect the body of a message as well as its header.
Many jurisdictions prohibit the use of forged or incomplete mes-
sage headers in unsolicited bulk or commercial e-mail messages. 253
The theory behind this approach presumably is that requiring accu-
rate routing information and related data in message headers makes it
easier both to block or filter spam and to trace it for the purpose of
complaining to spammers' service providers. 254
The use of misleading subject lines is prohibited in some states
for similar reasons.255 Misleading subject lines such as "RE: your mes-
sage" are used by spammers to induce recipients to read spam rather
than discarding it unread, and prohibiting this practice could make
manual filtering slightly easier.
Labeling of commercial messages seems to be a much more di-
rect means of enabling recipients and destination operators to filter
253. See, e.g., Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(a) (i) (West
Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.l(2)(b) (West Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:73.6(B) (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a)(6) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-52-4.1(7) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4(A)(7) (Michie Supp. 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1) (a) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-
2(1) (Michie 1999); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031,
2032 (to be codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 6-2.5-103(1)-(3)); Act ofJune 23, 1999, No. 99-
160, § 1 (b) (7), 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 449; Act ofJuly 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 8
(1999) (to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 937(b)); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423, § 1,
2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1373-74 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(3)); Act of
June 8, 1999, ch. 337, § 1, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515, 1515 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT.
tit. 15, § 776.1 (A)); see also Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Mar-
keting Act of 2000, S. 2542, 106th Cong. § 4(c); Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th
Cong. § 2(e); E-Mail User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (1999); In-
ternet Freedom Act, H.R. 1686, 106th Cong. § 104(1) (1999) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a) (5)).
254. In addition, some jurisdictions specifically prohibit the use of unrelated third par-
ties' domain names or other information in message headers. See, e.g., Illinois Electronic
Mail Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(a)(i) (West Supp. 2000)); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 714E.1(2) (a) (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(d) (Supp. 1999); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1)(a) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-2(1)
(Michie 1999); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2032
(to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-103(3)); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000
Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1373 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(3) (a)); see also Can
Spam Act, H.R. 2162, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
255. See, e.g., Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(a) (i) (West
Supp. 2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1)(b) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 46A-6G-2(2) (Michie 1999); see also Netizens Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 3024,
106th Cong. § 2(a) (3) (B). West Virginia's law also contains an additional content-based
restriction: unsolicited bulk e-mail messages may not contain "sexually explicit materials."
SeeW. VA. CODE ANN. . 46A-6G-2(4) (1999).
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spam, 256 and a fewjurisdictions have already adopted labeling require-
ments. Nevada, the first state to enact a spam law, requires merely that
unsolicited commercial e-mail messages must be "readily identifiable"
as such, 257 but at least two other states require that the advertising
label "ADV:" appear at the beginning of the subject line in such
messages. 258 Some states even require more specific labels for unsolic-
ited messages with sexually explicit content.259
5. Other Statutory Provisions
Finally, some jurisdictions impose other sorts of statutory restric-
tions on spam-related practices. For example, many states prohibit the
sale or distribution of software that is designed to facilitate the falsifi-
cation of routing information in e-mail message headers, enabling
spammers to cover their tracks. 260 Data protection laws in some coun-
256. See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 93, at 424, 427-28.
257. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.730(1) (c) (Michie Supp. 1999); see also Unsolicited
Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. § 5(a) (3) (A) (requiring
that UCE be clearly and conspicuously identifiable as such).
258. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17 538.4 (g) (Deering Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-2501(c) (Supp. 1999); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo.
Sess. Laws 2031, 2032-33 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-103(4)).
259. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17 5 3 8 .4 (g) (Deering Supp. 2000) (requiring
"ADV:ADLT" at beginning of subject line in messages advertising material available only to
adults); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(e) (Supp. 1999) (same as California statute); Act of
June 13, 2000, No. 25, §1, 2000 Pa. Legis. Serv. 91, 93 (to be codified at 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.
5903(a.1)) (requiring "ADV-ADULT" at beginning of subject line in advertising messages
containing explicit sexual materials).
260. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3(a-5) (West Supp. 2000); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:73.6(B) (West Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-52-4.1(8) (Supp. 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4 7 -18-2501(g) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 152.4(B) (Michie Supp.
2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-4 (Michie 1999); Act of June 23, 1999, No. 99-160,
§ 1(c), 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 449; Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 8 (1999)
(to be codified at DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 937(c)); Act ofJune 8, 1999, ch. 337, § 1, 1999 Okla.
Sess. Laws 1515, 1516 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.1(E)); see also Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2000, S. 2542, 106th Cong.
§ 4(d); E-Mail User Protection Act, H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (1999); Internet
Freedom Act, H.R. 1686, 106th Cong. § 104(1) (1999) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a) (5)). The software regulated by these statutes is commonly known as "spamware."
While "spamware" describes a broad range of programs intended for use in sending unso-
licited bulk e-mail, see Nick Nicholas, Spamware Defined, at http://mail-abuse.org/rbl/
spamware.htn (last modified Feb. 2, 2000), the statutes that regulate such software tend to
be relatively narrow in scope. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 152.4(B). Section 152.4(B) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell, give or otherwise distribute
or possess with the intent to sell, give or distribute software which (i) is primarily
designed or produced for the purpose of facilitating or enabling the falsification
of electronic mail transmission information or other routing information; (ii) has
only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to facilitate or
enable the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other rout-
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tries regulate the collection, use, and transfer of personal information
that may include e-mail addresses,26' and legislation has been pro-
posed in the United States Congress to restrict the ability of spammers
to harvest e-mail addresses from domain name registration records. 262
Many ISPs attempt to block incoming spam, in part because In-
ternet users tend to blame their own ISP for spam that they receive. 263
Many of the enacted and proposed laws explicitly permit destination
operators and ISPs to block spam,264 and there have even been pro-
posals to require ISPs to offer spam-filtering services to their subscrib-
ers, or to solicit and record their subscribers' preferences with regard
to receiving unsolicited messages.
2 6 5
6. Enforcement Mechanisms
A variety of enforcement mechanisms appear in spam-related leg-
islation. Many statutes confer a civil right of action upon individuals or
destination operators who receive unsolicited e-mail messages that vio-
late statutory requirements or who are injured as a result of receiving
such messages. Because it is generally difficult to measure and prove
actual damages-and probably because actual damages are likely to
be quite small-many of these laws provide for liquidated or statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages. 266 Several jurisdictions provide for
ing information; or (iii) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert
with that person with that person's knowledge for use in facilitating or enabling
the falsification of electronic mail transmission information or other routing
information.
Id.
261. See, e.g., Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Bill No.
C-6 (2000) (Can.), http://www.privcom.gc.ca/english/02_06_e.htm (enacted Apr. 13,
2000); see also supra Part IV.B.1 and accompanying notes (discussing European legislation
aimed at prohibition of spam).
262. See, e.g., Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act
of 2000, S. 2542, 106th Cong. § 6(a).
263. See Gartner Group, supra note 11, at 8.
264. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(0, (g) (West Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 714E.1(6)(b) (West Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.6(D) (West Supp.
2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4(D) (Michie Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.190.050 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-3 (Michie 1999); Colorado Junk
Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2034 (to be codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 6-2.5-104(5)); Act of June 23, 1999, No. 99-160, § I(e), 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 449;
Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1374 (to be codified at
IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(6)); Act of June 27, 2000, ch. 763, § A, 2000 Mo. Laws 735, 749 (to
be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1340).
265. See Inbox Privacy Act of 1999, S. 759, 106th Cong. § 2(c)(3)(C).
266. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(0 (Deering Supp. 2000) (an e-mail
service provider whose UCE policy is violated may recover actual monetary losses or liqui-
dated damages of $50 per message, up to a maximum of $25,000 per day, plus attorney's
[Vol. 35
criminal penalties or other governmental enforcement mechanisms in
addition to or in place of private actions.267
fees); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3(b) (4), (5) (West Supp. 2000) (same as Connecti-
cut statute); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(c), (d) (West Supp. 2000) (an injured
person may recover actual damages or $10 per message, up to a maximum of $25,000 per
day, plus attorney's fees); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.1 (3) (a), (3)(b), (4) (West Supp. 2000)
(an e-mail service provider may recover actual damages, $10 per message, or $25,000, plus
attorney's fees; any other injured person may recover actual damages, $10 per message, or
$500, plus attorney's fees; a recipient may also seek injunctive relief); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.730(2) (Michie Supp. 1999) (a recipient may recover actual damages or $10 per mes-
sage, plus attorney's fees, and may seek injunctive relief); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.2A(a)
(1999) (same as Connecticut statute); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-47-2(h) (Supp. 1999) (a recipient
may recover $100 for each violation plus attorney's fees); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-52-6(a), (b),
(c) (Supp. 1999) (an e-mail service provider may recover actual damages, $500 per mes-
sage, or $25,000 per day, plus attorney's fees; any other injured person may recover actual
damages or $500 per message, up to a maximum of $25,000 per day, plus attorney's fees;
punitive damages may also be available); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(i) (Supp. 1999)
(an e-mail service provider may recover actual damages, $10 per message, or $5000 per
day, plus attorney's fees; any other injured person may recover actual damages or $10 per
message, up to a maximum of $5000 per day, plus attorney's fees); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
152.12(B), (C) (Michie Supp. 2000) (same as Connecticut statute); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.190.040 (West 1999) (same as Missouri statute); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-5(b), (c),
(e) (Michie 1999) (an interactive service provider may recover actual damages, $10 per
message, or $25,000 per day, plus attorney's fees; a recipient may recover actual damages
or $1000, plus attorney's fees; punitive damages and injunctive relief may also be availa-
ble); Colorado Junk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2033-34 (to be
codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2.5-104) (a recipient or e-mail service provider may re-
cover actual damages plus a civil penalty of $10 per message, plus attorney's fees); Act of
June 23, 1999, No. 99-160, § 2(b),(c), 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 449-50 (an e-mail service pro-
vider may recover actual damages, $10 per message, or $25,000 per day, plus attorney's
fees; any other injured person may recover actual damages or $10 per message, up to a
maximum of $25,000 per day, plus attorney's fees); Act of Apr. 17, 2000, ch. 423, § 1, 2000
Idaho Sess. Laws 1373, 1374 (to be codified at IDAHO CODE § 48-603E(4)) (a recipient may
recover actual damages, $100 per message, or $1000); Act of June 27, 2000, ch. 763, § A,
2000 Mo. Laws 735, 749 (to be codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.1330) (an interactive ser-
vice provider may recover actual damages or $1000; a recipient may recover actual dam-
ages or $500); Act of June 8, 1999, ch. 337, § 2, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515, 1516 (to be
codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.2(B), (C)) (same as Connecticut statute).
267. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(d) (4) (Deering Supp. 2000) (violation may be
punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3(a-5),
(b) (1) (West Supp. 2000) (defining offense of computer tampering, a misdemeanor);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.2 (West Supp. 2000) (authorizing attorney general to seek injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties, and to bring action for damages for the benefit of injured
consumers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.6(C) (West Supp. 2000) (violation punishable by
fine of not more than $5000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(b) (1999) (violation constitutes
computer trespass, a misdemeanor or felony, depending upon extent of damage); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-1604 (1995) (violation punishable by civil penalty of $100); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.4(C) (Michie Supp. 2000) (violation constitutes computer trespass, a mis-
demeanor or felony, depending upon intent and injury); Act ofJune 23, 1999, No. 99-160,
§ 1 (d), 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 449 (violation constitutes a misdemeanor or felony, depend-
ing upon intent and injury); Act of June 23, 1999, No. 99-160, § 3, 1999 Conn. Acts 446,
450 (authorizing attorney general to bring action for damages for benefit of injured pri-
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C. Limitations of Legal Approaches
Lawsuits and targeted legislation can ameliorate the spam prob-
lem by imposing costs and other disincentives on spammers, but it is
very unlikely that legal approaches alone will be successful in eradicat-
ing spam.
1. Enforcement Problems
Jurisdictional barriers, together with practical issues of enforce-
ment and circumvention, are probably the most significant limitations
of legal responses to spam. Unlike most other forms of communica-
tion, electronic mail generally is unaffected by state and evennational
boundaries. 268 Furthermore, many e-mail addresses provide no indica-
tion of the addressee's physical location, and even an e-mail address
that does include a geographic identifier frequently can be used from
anywhere in the world.269 Some spam-related laws include specific ju-
risdictional provisions-for example, providing that a state can exert
long-arm jurisdiction over a person who sends e-mail into the state or
uses a server located in the state. 270 But even if such an exercise of
vate parties); Act ofJuly 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 7-9 (1999) (to be codified at
DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 937, 938) (defining crimes of "un-requested or unauthorized elec-
tronic mail" and "failure to promptly cease electronic communication upon request"); Act
ofJune 8, 1999, ch. 337, § 1, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515, 1515 (to be codified at OKLA.
SiAr. tit. 15, § 776.1 (B)) (violation punishable by civil penalty of up to $500); Act ofJune
13, 2000, No. 25, §1, 2000 Pa. Legis. Serv. 91, 93 (amending 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5903(h)
and to be codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5903(1)) (violation constitutes a misdemeanor or
felony, with additional fine or imprisonment for attempt to evade prosecution).
268. A fax marketer operating from offshore in order to evade a country's laws would
likely sustain substantial long distance telephone charges; international telemarketing and
direct mail are similarly subject to higher costs than domestic communications (although
at least in the case of telemarketing, these costs may be offset by lower labor costs). The
already negligible marginal cost of e-mail communications, on the other hand, is normally
entirely independent of the physical locations of the sender and the recipient. National
laws regulating unsolicited faxes and other forms of telephone and direct mail marketing
are thus more likely to be effective than those regulating unsolicited e-mail.
269. It can be difficult or impossible to determine where a particular message
originated (even if the sender's e-mail address appears in the message), and a sender gen-
erally cannot determine the location of a recipient if the only information he or she has is
the recipient's e-mail address.
270. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(d) (Deering Supp. 2000); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 511/10(b) (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.1 (5) (West Supp.
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-47-2(a), (d), (g) (Supp.
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(f) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(B)
(Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1), (2) (West Supp. 2001); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46A-6G-2, -5(d) (Michie 1999); ColoradoJunk Email Law, ch. 388, § 1, 2000
Colo. Sess. Laws 2031, 2034 (to be codified at CoLo. REV. SrAT. § 6-2.5-105); Act of June 23,
1999, No. 99-160, § 4, 1999 Conn. Acts 446, 450 (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
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jurisdiction comports with constitutional requirements, 271 it may be
difficult to locate and subsequently to enforce a judgment on some-
one in another state or country. Indeed, it is certainly conceivable that
spammers will begin making use of "spam havens"272-jurisdictions
with spam-friendly laws-just as many spammers now use "bulk-
friendly" ISPs. 273 Legislation may fare somewhat better at addressing
spamming by legitimate mainstream businesses, particularly brick-and-
mortar companies seeking to communicate with potential customers
in their own geographic area, but this type of advertising probably
represents only a very small proportion of present-day spam.
2. Lack of Uniformity
Linking spam rules to legal jurisdictions has another potential
drawback: an inevitable lack of uniformity. Perhaps the best example
to date is in the two conflicting labeling schemes that have been en-
acted by various states. Under Pennsylvania law, it is a misdemeanor to
send an e-mail message containing "explicit sexual materials" unless
the first nine characters in the subject line are "ADV-ADULT" 274; but
the laws of California and Tennessee require messages intended only
for adults to contain "ADV:ADLT" as the first eight characters in the
59b(a)); Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 135, § 1, 72 Del. Laws 7, 8 (1999) (to be codified at DEL.
CODE tit. 11, § 937(d)); Act of June 8, 1999, ch. 337, § 3, 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws 1515,
1516-17 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.3).
271. While sending a single e-mail message into ajurisdiction probably is insufficient to
subject the sender to long-arm jurisdiction, a spammer who sends hundreds or thousands
of unsolicited messages into a state may well have sufficient contacts with the state to sup-
port personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding no jurisdiction over non-resident defendant who maintained a passive
web page advertising its services); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who made fraudulent representation to plaintiff
in Connecticut via phone and e-mail); EDIAS Software Int'l L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947
F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding jurisdiction over non-resident defendant based on
substantial contacts with Arizona, including contact via phone, fax and e-mail).
272. See Lessig & Resnick, supra note 93, at 428. Interestingly, an offshore data haven
that announced its launch in mid-2000 claimed it would serve as a sanctuary for anything
but spamming and child pornography-at least in the case of spamming, apparently be-
cause of the company's fear of technical rather than legal reprisals. See HavenCo, Acceptable
Use Policy, at http://www.havenco.com/legal/aup.htmI (last modified June 2, 2000);
Declan McCullagh, A Data Sanctuary Is Born, WIRED NEWS, June 4, 2000, at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,36749,00.html.
273. See Internet Spam Industry FAQ ver. 1.0, at http://world.std.com/FAQ/Internet/
abuse/Spam-Industry-FAQ.txt (Jan. 21, 1998); The Spamhaus Project, at http://
www.spamhaus.org/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
274. SeeAct ofJune 13, 2000, No. 25, §1, 2000 Pa. Legis. Serv. 91, 93 (to be codified at
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5903(a.1)).
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subject line.2 7 5 One solution is to incorporate some sort of "Internet
standards" by reference in a statute, 276 but this approach raises
problems of notice and accountability, among others.
3. Narrow Approach
A lack of flexibility is another problem with legislative attempts to
curtail spam. The war between spammers and anti-spammers has fre-
quently been described as an arms race,277 with each side constantly
developing new weapons. A statute that attempts to incorporate these
weapons-for example, a particular labeling method or opt-out sys-
tem-is likely to be obsolete before it takes effect because of the rapid
advancement in technology. On the other hand, while the application
of existing common law theories to spam provides a degree of flexibil-
ity that is not available in highly targeted legislation, the unintended
consequences that may result from stretching the law in such a man-
ner may outweigh the benefits of avoiding legislation. 278
4. Legitimization of Spam
Another objection to legislative approaches is that a partial solu-
tion, one that regulates spam without prohibiting it altogether, will
merely serve to legitimize spam. For example, if the law requires spam
to be labeled and to include opt-out instructions, the stigma presently
attached to spam will begin to disappear. Although it will be easier
and less costly to filter out or delete each individual piece of spam, the
overall volume of spam will likely increase exponentially as more
275. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17 538.4(g) (Deering Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-2501 (e) (Supp. 1999).
276. See, e.g., Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000, H.R. 3113, 106th
Cong. § 5(b) (2) (B) (ii) (permitting a provider's notice of its UCE policy to be published
"in accordance with a technological standard adopted by an appropriate Internet stan-
dards setting body (such as the Internet Engineering Task Force) and recognized by the
[FTC] by rule as a fair standard").
277. See, e.g., Cranor & LaMacchia, supra note 9, at 79; John Markoff, Internet Is Ex-
panding Arms Race with Junk E-Mail, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at D1; Barry D. Bowen,
Controlling Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail, SUNWORLD, Aug. 1997, at http://www.sunworld.com/
swol-08-1997/swol-08-junkemail.html; Eamonn Sullivan, The "Star Wars" Phase of Anti-Spam
Tools, PC WK., Mar. 13, 1998, http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/pcwk/1511/
293774.html.
278. See Burk, supra note 162, at 54-55 (criticizing application of the trespass to chat-
tels doctrine to spare cases, and referring to "a sort of legal mission creep that allows a
common law doctrine to mutate from the cure for an isolated problem to the pathology in
a broad body of caselaw").
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mainstream businesses begin to use it, and the aggregate costs that
spam imposes may well increase. 279
5. Constitutional Concerns
Finally, a very real problem with legislative responses to spam is
that an effective anti-spam statute is likely to be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds. For example, state courts in California and Wash-
ington have held those states' anti-spam statutes unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause because they place a burden on inter-
state commerce. 280 And despite the fact that most span is commercial
speech, many commentators and advocates have raised First Amend-
ment objections to governmental regulation of spam.28 t
Conclusion
Neither technical measures nor legal approaches have succeeded
in eliminating spam, and self-regulation and other informal efforts
have fared even worse. Technical responses to spain have been largely
ineffectual and impose substantial costs that ultimately are passed on
to Internet users, while frequently interfering with legitimate commu-
nications. Lawsuits may have driven a few spammers out of business,
but they rarely afford an adequate remedy and have done little to
change spammers' behavior. No jurisdiction has yet enacted truly
comprehensive anti-spain legislation, but it seems unlikely that even
well-drafted legislation will be capable of solving the problem.
279. See discussion supra note 86 (discussing self-regulation and stigma). Political reali-
ties make it especially likely that such a counterproductive partial solution may result from
the legislative process, as has occurred in Nevada and elsewhere. See, e.g., Mark Grossman,
Spam: A Tasteless Part of Cyberspace, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, Legal
Times File (describing Nevada spain law as "watered-down"); Peter Lewis, Locke Signs
"Spam"Bill to Reduce Junk E-Mail, SEAT-rLE TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, 1998 WL 3145243 (quoting
California attorney David Kramer calling Nevada's spain law "worse than no law at all").
280. See Ferguson v. Friendfinder, No. 307309 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 2, 2000) (order
sustaining defendant's demurrer without leave to amend) (finding CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17538.4 unconstitutional); State v. Heskel, No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.
Mar. 10, 2000) (order granting defendant's summary judgment) (finding the Washington
spam law, found at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.190.020, .030, unconstitutional), http://
www.wa-state-resident.com/agheck02.htm. The Louisiana spain law has also been chal-
lenged, although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds. See Fox v. Reed, No. 99-
3094, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2000) (dismissing case raising various
constitutional challenges to LA. REv. STAT. § 14:73.6 based on plaintiffs lack of standing).
281. See Developments, supra note 37, at 1622-34 (discussing First Amendment objec-
tions to application of common-law trespass doctrine to unsolicited noncommercial e-
mail); see also sources cited supra note 2.
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The responses to spam that have been implemented to date have
done little more than heighten the level of uncertainty that surrounds
spam. Internet users flock from one ISP to another in attempts to es-
cape spam, and this churn squeezes profitability for ISPs. 282 Responsi-
ble marketers for the most part are trying to avoid even the
appearance of spam, but they face challenges in deciding when it is
appropriate to use e-mail even when communicating with existing
customers. 2
8 3
Coordination of technical and legal mechanisms seems to be the
most promising approach to the spam problem. The first step must be
to agree upon the ultimate objective: it is quite easy to declare "get rid
of spam," but the definition of spam is sufficiently controversial that
this first step may be the most difficult.284 Technical and legal mea-
sures can then be used in a complementary fashion-for example,
technical measures can be designed so that one must break the law
(or subject oneself to liability) in order to circumvent them,285 while
those who evade or ignore legal controls could be subjected to
blackholing and other technical responses.
Yet it is probably unrealistic to expect that the consensus required
for such coordination can be achieved. More likely, the technical arms
race between spammers and anti-spammers will escalate, and more
and more innocent bystanders will be caught in the crossfire. States
and countries will continue enacting an increasingly diverse set of
spam-related statutes, and traditional legal theories will be stretched
and distorted even further in efforts to address spam and other forms
of "network abuse." The news is not all bad; there have been advances
in collaborative filtering by companies such as Brightmail, and some
recent legislation seems to incorporate at least a rough comprehen-
sion of the underlying technology. Nonetheless, a coordinated solu-
tion to the problem of spam remains elusive at best.
282. See Gartner Group, supra note 11, at 8, 11.
283. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, Spamming by the Book Is StillJunk from "the Slime Pit, "USA
TODAY, Nov. 3, 1999, at 5D.
284. See supra Part I.A.
285. See, for example, the discussion of a "not spam" labeling protocol, supra note 93.
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